[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3q1j3esd11zuw":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":17,"affectedCount":17,"affectedCountStatus":18,"affectedCountLowerBound":19,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":21,"dataClasses":22,"description":30,"seoTitle":31,"seoTitleEn":32,"seoDescription":31,"seoDescriptionEn":33,"logoUrl":34,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":35,"isMalware":35,"company":36},"68e3266eda11adda48825156","color-dating","Color Dating Data Breach","colordatingapp.com","2018-09-05T00:00:00.000Z","2025-03-03T05:03:18.000Z","2026-07-02T12:26:55.059Z","2026-07-18T23:48:11.888Z","Third party breach","https:\u002F\u002Fdatabreach.com\u002Fbreach\u002Fcolor-dating-2018",[15],220503,"known",null,"unknown","High",[23,24,25,26,27,28,29],"Bios","Dates of birth","Email addresses","Geographic locations","Names","Passwords","Profile photos","\u003Cp>The Color Dating data breach is a sensitive incident associated with the exposure of account data belonging to a dating application focused on connecting users from different ethnic backgrounds, which occurred around September 2018. The verified number of affected accounts for this record is 220,503 unique email addresses. The reason the incident is considered sensitive is not only because it contains email addresses and password hashes; the biography texts shared by users in their dating profiles, names, birth dates, approximate location information, and profile pictures also pose a high risk in terms of personal privacy.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In a leak of this kind of dating application, the context of the data is as important as technical aspects. An email address being linked to only one account may often seem like a limited risk; however, when the same record contains information such as a profile description, photo, name, and date of birth, the person becomes easier to identify. Reporting a password field as a hash protected with bcrypt does not mean that the readable password value was published directly, but it does not completely eliminate the risk of account takeover for weak or reused passwords.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The verified data classes are biography texts, birth dates, email addresses, geographic location information, names, password hashes, and profile photos. Biography fields may include the user's interests, relationship expectations, personal preferences, or free text they write to introduce themselves. Free text fields are riskier than standard form fields because users may unknowingly include additional clues such as their job, school, city of residence, social media account, private habits, or family information.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>When birth date and name information are combined with an email address, they can be used to guess authentication questions, create fake accounts, and attempt targeted fraud. Geographic location information, especially in the context of dating apps, can lead to inferences about the area where the user lives or frequently visits. Profile photos, on the other hand, pose risks such as facial recognition, reverse image search, social media matching, and fake profile creation. Therefore, the incident should be assessed not only in terms of password security but also in terms of privacy and reputation risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>This record is based on 220,503 unique email addresses. The row counts in some secondary lists may appear different; however, the scope used for user lookup here is maintained based on unique email addresses. The incident is related to the Color Dating leak from September 2018, and it is understood that the data later resurfaced within a larger leak compilation. Therefore, even if the incident is dated, the renewed sharing of the data can keep user risk current.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Verified fields are bio, date of birth, email address, geographic location, name, password, and profile picture categories. The password field should be considered as a hash protected with bcrypt; this statement alone does not indicate that passwords are published in their decrypted form. In this record, payment card, bank account, passport number, official ID number, private message content, or phone number is not a verified data class. Keeping these boundaries clear is important to accurately convey real risks to the user without causing unnecessary panic.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The people at highest risk are users who use their real name, primary email address, clear profile photo, and the region they live in on their Color Dating account. Since the information used in dating apps can be directly linked to private life, users may be exposed to targeted embarrassment, fake intimacy, identity impersonation, or social engineering attempts. Using the same email address for work, banking, social media, or other memberships also makes it easier for attackers to correlate different accounts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The risk is greater for users who use their password on other services as well. While the bcrypt hash format makes the attacker's job harder, weak, short, or previously leaked passwords can still be subjected to brute-force attacks. Users with birthdate and location information can be tricked through fake birthday campaigns, local event invitations, or messages that appear to come from acquaintances. For individuals with a profile photo, the risk of creating a fake social media profile or dating profile should also be taken into consideration.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The user who discovers a match in this record should first change the password used for Color Dating and any accounts where the same password may have been used. The new password should be unique for each service, long, and difficult to guess. Multi-factor authentication should be enabled on the email account, and recent sessions and forwarding rules should be checked. If the user logs into social media, shopping, financial, or work accounts with the same email address, security notifications and suspicious session records on those accounts should also be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Due to the context of the dating app, special attention should be paid to incoming messages. Messages referring to old profile information, photos, birth date, or the area of residence should not be automatically assumed to be correct, even if they seem trustworthy. Links sent under the pretense of meeting, account verification, photo removal, complaint closure, or membership reinstatement should be independently checked before being opened. Personal photos, identification documents, verification codes, or financial information should not be shared with people who request them.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The Color Dating incident shows that profile information shared on dating and social discovery apps can affect the user even years later. Users should not share their real name, birth date, exact location, workplace, school, and social media accounts excessively on such apps. When choosing profile photos, it should not be forgotten that using the same images on other platforms can make identity matching easier. Old accounts should be closed or updated, and profile information on unused apps should be minimized as much as possible.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Password management is a fundamental part of long-term protection. Using a unique password for each service, generating strong passwords with a password manager, and protecting the email account with additional verification reduce the chain effect of such leaks. Users should also periodically check for fake profiles created with their names, photos, and email addresses. In this incident, since the verified data is particularly related to privacy, not only technical account security but also online reputation and personal safety should be considered together.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>A match in this record indicates that the relevant email address is among the unique email addresses seen in the Color Dating leak. A match does not necessarily mean that all profile details of the user are publicly available; however, due to the data classes associated with this record, the user should be cautious regarding their bio, name, date of birth, location, profile photo, and password security. Action should not be delayed, especially for individuals who use the same email and password across different services.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The user should first make their passwords unique, strengthen their email account, and check for suspicious logins. Then, they should review public information on dating apps and social media profiles. Fields such as date of birth, location, and photo should be removed as unnecessary information because they increase the risk of identity matching. Even though the incident dates back to 2018, the fact that the data later circulated again means that old records can be used in current fraud attempts.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Color Dating Data Breach (220.5 Thousand Reported Records)","Color Dating Data Breach. 220.5 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Bios, Dates of birth, Email addresses. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fcolordatingapp_com.webp",false,{"name":37,"sector":38,"country":39,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":31,"websiteStatus":31,"websiteCheckedAt":19},"Color Dating","Dating app","United States"]