[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f2rowxdmnccmp5":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":20,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":22,"dataClasses":23,"description":31,"seoTitle":32,"seoTitleEn":33,"seoDescription":32,"seoDescriptionEn":34,"logoUrl":35,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":36,"isSpamList":36,"isMalware":36,"company":37},"68e3266eda11adda4882519b","ducks-unlimited","Ducks Unlimited Data Breach","ducks.org","2021-01-29T00:00:00.000Z","2021-11-16T01:24:35.000Z","2026-07-09T22:01:21.408Z","2026-07-18T23:49:55.968Z","Database leak","https:\u002F\u002Fblind9.com\u002Fducks-unlimited-data-breach\u002F",[15,17],"https:\u002F\u002Fprivacyrights.org\u002Fdata-breaches",1324364,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30],"Dates of birth","Email addresses","Names","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Hashed passwords","Passwords","\u003Cp>The Ducks Unlimited data breach is an incident involving account and member information associated with a U.S.-based conservation organization that has membership and donation relationships, with data from January 2021. The record contains 1,324,364 unique email addresses. Verified data fields include dates of birth, email addresses, names, phone numbers, physical addresses, and unsalted MD5 password hashes. The fact that the data encompasses both membership lists and website user lists makes this record significant not only in terms of web accounts but also in terms of donor and member privacy.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In this incident, the password field was reported not as plain text but as an unsalted MD5 password hash. Since MD5 is considered weak by modern standards, the risk is particularly high for short, common, or reused passwords. Address, phone number, date of birth, and name information also provide a strong context for social engineering. This record does not contain verified data fields for credit card, bank account, donation amount, official ID, or payment history; the focus of the risk is membership contact information, physical address privacy, and password reuse attempts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The verified data types are birth dates, email addresses, names, phone numbers, physical addresses, and unsalted MD5 password hashes. When email, name, phone, and address are combined, the user's identity profile becomes quite apparent. When the birth date is added, fake membership verification, donation updates, address confirmation, or account recovery messages can become more convincing. The physical address field is particularly important because the risk is not limited to online account security; it can also pave the way for targeted fraud via mail and phone.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>A password hash is not a plain text password, but an unsalted MD5 structure is not considered strong protection. Attackers can more easily guess weak passwords and try them on other accounts with the same email. Users in organizations with membership or donation relationships may have used the same email and password on other associations, shopping sites, forums, or email accounts. Therefore, the Ducks Unlimited data breach should be evaluated not only for spam risk but also in terms of account takeover, donor fraud, and address privacy.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The verified incident date is tracked as January 29, 2021. The dataset was reported in the context of a Ducks Unlimited database that was bought and sold online in mid-2021 and was added to verified breach records on November 16, 2021. The record contains 1,324,364 unique email addresses. In some accounts, the phrase about approximately 1.3 million users or members may be used; this page is based on the exact number of unique emails used in the query.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The scope should be read through two main lists: the membership list and the website user list. This does not mean that every matching person has all of the same data fields. Some records may appear in the context of member information, while others in the context of web account information. Verified fields are date of birth, email, name, phone, physical address, and password hash. Credit card, bank account, donation amount, official ID, or sensitive health data are not verified data classes for this record.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The highest risk group consists of Ducks Unlimited members, donors, and users with a website account. For individuals listed on the membership list, fields such as address, phone number, and date of birth can pose a more direct privacy risk. For users with a website account, the risk of password reuse comes to the forefront. If the same email and password are used on other accounts, attackers may try this information on different services. Donor or member relationships can be used as a trust element in fake donation renewal or membership verification messages.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>People whose physical address and phone number are leaked can be targeted via mail, phone, or email. An attacker can prepare a fake donation campaign, membership update, reward notification, or account verification message coming in the name of the organization. The date of birth can also be used in these messages to create additional trust. Even if the record is old, fields like address and date of birth may not change for a long time. Therefore, users should protect not only their passwords but also their communication channels.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If the password used for the Ducks Unlimited account is still active on another account, it should be changed immediately. If the same or a similar password has been used on email, donation, shopping, social media, or forum accounts, unique passwords should be assigned to all these accounts. Two-factor authentication should be enabled on the primary email account. If the email account is compromised, password reset links for other accounts are also at risk. Using a password manager makes it easier to find old password repetitions.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Donation, membership renewal, address verification, or account update requests received via phone, mail, and email should be carefully checked. Even if your name, address, or date of birth is correctly mentioned in the message, this alone is not proof of security. Requests asking for payment, card number, bank information, one-time code, or password should be stopped and the transaction should be verified through known official channels. In this incident, even if the payment recipient was not verified, the leaked contact information could be used later to trick into obtaining payment information.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>In the long term, separate, unique passwords should be used for membership and donation accounts. Using the same email address for multiple donation, campaign, and membership accounts increases the risk of targeted fraud. Users should close web accounts they no longer use, review their communication preferences, and minimize unnecessary profile fields. Accounts containing physical address and phone information should be checked regularly. Even old addresses can be used in social engineering as past authentication information.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>On the corporate side, this incident shows that membership and donation data should be considered sensitive personal data. Password hashes should not be stored using weak methods like unsalted MD5; modern, costly, and salted hash methods should be used. Member and web user lists should not be retained unnecessarily long, access permissions should be minimized, high-volume export activities should be monitored, and post-violation notifications should be clear. Donor trust depends not only on the protection of payment data but also on the protection of address and contact information.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If you see a match in this record, your email address may have been found among 1,324,364 unique emails associated with the Ducks Unlimited data breach. A match does not mean your payment card or bank information has been leaked. The verified fields are date of birth, email, name, phone, physical address, and unsalted MD5 password hash. The first step is to check where else you have reused your old password used on this account.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>If your old password is used on other accounts, change it. Enable two-step verification on your email account and verify membership or donation-related messages directly through official channels. Do not hastily share payment or verification information in messages that include address and phone details. The correct approach for the Ducks Unlimited data breach is not just to see the incident as a leak of a membership list, but to acknowledge that weak password hashes combined with address and phone data can pose long-term account and fraud risks.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Ducks Unlimited Data Breach (1.3 Million Reported Records)","Ducks Unlimited Data Breach. 1.3 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fducks_org.webp",false,{"name":38,"sector":39,"country":40,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":32,"websiteStatus":32,"websiteCheckedAt":20},"Ducks Unlimited","Other","United States"]