[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fg2jcsry8xjd5":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":20,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":22,"dataClasses":23,"description":31,"seoTitle":32,"seoTitleEn":33,"seoDescription":32,"seoDescriptionEn":34,"logoUrl":35,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":36,"isSpamList":36,"isMalware":36,"company":37},"68e3266eda11adda488251e2","Fotolog","Fotolog Data Breach","fotolog","fotolog.com","2018-12-01T00:00:00.000Z","2021-06-15T03:20:43.000Z","2026-07-20T00:38:18.503Z","Database leak","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.theregister.com\u002Fsecurity\u002F2019\u002F02\u002F11\u002F620-million-accounts-stolen-from-16-hacked-websites-now-for-sale-on-dark-web-seller-boasts\u002F665817",[15,17],"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002F20181220020711id_\u002Fhttps:\u002F\u002Ffotolog.com\u002F",16717854,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30],"Email addresses","Geographic locations","Names","Passwords","Profile information","Security questions and answers","Usernames","\u003Cp>The December 2018 Fotolog data breach affected 16,717,854 unique email addresses together with usernames and password hashes.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Types of Exposed Data and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The verified dataset contained email addresses, usernames and unsalted SHA-256 password hashes. A contemporaneous technical review of the five Fotolog databases offered for sale also reported full names, geographical locations, interests and other profile information, plus security questions and answers. \u003Cstrong>The 16,717,854 unique email addresses\u003C\u002Fstrong> represent deduplicated emails in the verified corpus; the figure does not establish that every row belonged to a different person or that every additional field appeared for every account. Combining email, username, name and profile information can support targeted phishing and correlation with accounts on other platforms. Reused security-question answers may weaken password-reset procedures elsewhere. Password hashes are not plaintext, but a fast unsalted hash scheme is weak against offline guessing, especially when passwords are short, common or previously exposed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Breach Timeline and Technical Details\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Fotolog account data was reportedly taken in December 2018 and offered as a separate package on a criminal marketplace in February 2019 alongside databases attributed to many other organizations. The Fotolog package was advertised as five databases totaling about 5.9 GB and more than 16 million account records. Although the seller claimed to have exploited web-application flaws across different sites, public evidence did not establish Fotolog's specific entry point, affected system or attack chain; remote-code execution must therefore not be presented as the confirmed root cause. Independent verification later established a corpus of 16,717,854 unique email addresses. This was a distinct database directly attributed to Fotolog's account structure, not a generic credential collection. The service was dissolved in 2019 and its domain was later repurposed; the absence of a current Fotolog account portal does not remove the risk created by historical data.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The highest-risk group consists of people who reused their 2018 Fotolog password on email, social media, a photo service or another account. \u003Cstrong>Unsalted SHA-256 password hashes\u003C\u002Fstrong> cause identical passwords to produce identical hashes and allow attackers to test common password lists at high speed. A hash does not reveal its password directly, and long unique passwords remain harder to recover. Short, dictionary-based or previously breached passwords are substantially easier to guess. People who reused a security-question answer on another service also face password-reset and account-recovery attacks. Combining a full name, location, interests, username and email can help criminals craft messages that refer to an old photograph or community context. \u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Immediate Steps to Take\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If you remember your old Fotolog password, identify every account that still uses the same or a similar password and replace each copy with a long, unique credential. Prioritize your primary mailbox, social networks, cloud photo storage and services that retain payment methods. If you reused a Fotolog security-question answer, change it wherever possible; choose an unpredictable random answer stored in a password manager rather than a real biographical fact. Review unfamiliar email sessions, recovery addresses and forwarding rules, then enable multi-factor authentication. Distrust messages claiming to restore old Fotolog photos, reopen an account, resolve copyright complaints or verify a profile; criminals can use the historical brand and a real username. Because the original service no longer operates, treat any message offering a Fotolog account-reset link with particular suspicion.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Use a password manager to generate a random, unique password for every service so recovery of one hash cannot spread to other accounts. Keep multi-factor authentication enabled on email and critical services, favoring phishing-resistant security keys or device-based methods when available. \u003Cstrong>Permanently retire the old Fotolog password and its security answers\u003C\u002Fstrong>; reusing them with minor spelling changes does not provide meaningful protection. Remember that locations, interests and historical usernames visible on social profiles can personalize phishing, and reduce unnecessary visibility. Continue monitoring old email addresses in breach checks and verify unexpected password-reset alerts through an independent channel. Data from a closed service can circulate indefinitely, so a durable security plan must cover credentials and identity details used years ago, not only current accounts.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Check Your Data\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Use the secure search field on this page to check every current and historical email address you may have used with Fotolog. A match means the address is among the 16,717,854 unique emails in the verified corpus; it does not prove that the password was recovered, another account was accessed or every profile field existed for that person. If you receive a result, review other accounts that used the 2018-era password or security answers, remove every surviving reuse and inspect mailbox security. No result is an absolute guarantee because an address may have been written differently, the corpus may omit a record or another breach may still apply. Enter only the supported identifier in the search field; never provide a password, password hash, security answer, one-time code or payment information. Rechecking older addresses periodically can reveal datasets verified years after an incident. If an unexpected warning arrives, avoid its embedded link and access the relevant service directly through an independent route.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Fotolog Data Breach (16.7 Million Reported Records)","Fotolog Data Breach. 16.7 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Geographic locations, Names. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Ffotolog_com.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":38,"country":39,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":32,"websiteStatus":32,"websiteCheckedAt":20},"Photo-sharing social network","Spain"]