[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3iknmjxdo92wg":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":17,"affectedCount":17,"affectedCountStatus":18,"affectedCountLowerBound":19,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":21,"dataClasses":22,"description":27,"seoTitle":15,"seoTitleEn":28,"seoDescription":15,"seoDescriptionEn":29,"logoUrl":30,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":31,"isSpamList":31,"isMalware":31,"company":32},"68e3266eda11adda48825232","hunt-stand","HuntStand Data Breach","huntstand","huntstand.com","2024-03-08T00:00:00.000Z","2024-09-19T07:31:13.000Z","2026-07-18T23:52:06.746Z","Third party breach","",[],2795947,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[23,24,25,26],"Dates of birth","Email addresses","Geographic locations","Names","\u003Cp>The HuntStand data breach is a verified record dated March 2024 associated with the hunting and land management service huntstand.com. The incident involved approximately 2.8 million unique email addresses; many records also contained name, date of birth, and country information. The supported data classes are dates of birth, email addresses, geographic location information, and names. The password field is not listed in this record. In the context of hunting and land management, combined with location information, it may create a risk of targeted fraud in terms of users’ interests, country of residence, and outdoor activity profile.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>In a HuntStand record, the email address increases the risk of reaching the user, the name information increases personalization, the date of birth increases identity verification risk, and the geographic location field increases user profile and regional targeting risk. Under this record, password, phone, physical address, payment information, or exact coordinate data are not listed. This distinction is important; the record does not mean that exact land or hunting spot details have been leaked. However, even country or location information can be used in fake license, permit, equipment sales, or app notification messages.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The HuntStand incident is maintained at a confirmed status and covers approximately 2.8 million unique email addresses. The data classes are limited; since it does not include passwords, the direct account takeover risk is lower compared to password leaks. Nevertheless, the combination of name, date of birth, and geographic fields increases the risk of social engineering. To provide accurate information to the user, it has not been described as if phone, payment, physical address, or detailed property data were leaked. The risk lies in matching the user identity with the context of outdoor activities.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Hunters using HuntStand, land managers, individuals interested in outdoor sports, and users who use the same email address for license, equipment, map, or community accounts are at risk. Date of birth and name information can make fake license renewal, equipment campaign, or app account verification messages more convincing. Geographical information can be used in scams themed around regional hunting seasons, permits, or land services. Even if the password hasn't been leaked, the risk of targeted messages remains.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Users who have a HuntStand match should carefully check messages related to hunting licenses, map subscriptions, equipment discounts, permit renewals, or app verification. Links should not be opened directly, and verification should be done through the official app or a known website. If the date of birth is used in security questions, it should be changed. Since the password field is not listed, forced password panic is not required; however, if the same account has a weak or reused password, it should be updated. Two-factor authentication should be enabled on the email account.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Profile information shared in outdoor, hunting, and location-based applications should be regularly reviewed. Users should not share their real birth date in unnecessary services, should limit location visibility, and should use a unique password for each application. Email aliases help separate different hobby and membership accounts. Payment and licensing transactions related to hunting or land management should only be conducted through official channels. This way, even if contact data is leaked, the chain of fraud becomes more difficult.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If a HuntStand match appears in the LeakData check, the user should consider this as an identity and location context risk, not a password leak. The match includes email, and in some records, name, date of birth, and geographic information. The user should be cautious of targeted hunting, license, or equipment messages, remove the birth date from security questions, and protect the email account with strong authentication. Although this record is verified, it does not contain claims of payment, phone number, or exact terrain coordinates. If the user has registered with the same email on other outdoor, mapping, or equipment services, they should also verify incoming regional offers and license messages on these accounts with the same caution.\u003C\u002Fp>","HuntStand Data Breach (2.8 Million Reported Records)","HuntStand Data Breach. 2.8 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Dates of birth, Email addresses, Geographic locations. Review the scope…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fhuntstand_com.webp",false,{"name":33,"sector":34,"country":35,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":15,"websiteStatus":15,"websiteCheckedAt":19},"HuntStand","Hunting \u002F Land Management App","United States"]