[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3krdi91jtp4hr":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":21,"availableLocales":22,"translations":24,"severity":27,"dataClasses":28,"description":33,"seoTitle":34,"seoDescription":35,"logoUrl":36,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":37,"isMalware":37,"company":38},"6a452308a20f867c8ba8e763","legionproxy","LegionProxy Data Breach","legionproxy.io","2026-04-06T00:00:00.000Z","2026-05-06T10:11:25.000Z",null,"2026-07-07T10:14:39.764Z","2026-07-19T00:03:06.054Z","Third party breach","",[],10144,"known","unknown","en",[21,23],"tr",{"en":25,"tr":26},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"Medium",[29,30,31,32],"Email addresses","Names","Passwords","Purchases","\u003Cp>The LegionProxy data breach was recorded in April 2026 with the exposure of user records associated with a commercial residential type and an ISP proxy network. The dataset, which included approximately 10,000 unique email addresses, contained names, purchase records, and password hashes stored in bcrypt format. Although the number of records is not very large, due to the context of the proxy service, the incident carries targeted fraud risks through account security and payment history.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>The types of data listed in this record are Email addresses, Names, Passwords, and Purchases. The presence of the password field requires affected users to check whether they use the same or similar password on other services. Purchase records can be used in fake invoices, subscription renewals, license extensions, or payment verification messages because they indicate the user's commercial relationship with the service.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>Since proxy services are technical products, users may be accustomed to receiving messages such as support, access, IP pool, balance, integration key, or subscription alerts. This normal communication flow makes it difficult to distinguish fake messages. When an attacker knows the user's name, email address, and purchase history, they can prepare a message that appears like a real account notification.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>The use of Bcrypt is a positive sign in terms of password security; however, the risk still continues with weak or reused passwords. Users need to change the password they use on their LegionProxy account, and also update any email, payment, server management, developer panel, or other proxy accounts that use the same password. If multi-factor authentication is supported, it should be enabled.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>The Purchases section can provide clues about which product or service users are interested in. This information can be used for fake renewal invoices, fake credit load notifications, fake refund requests, or service outage alerts. Instead of clicking on links in messages related to payment or subscription, you should manually log in to the known panel and directly check the transaction history.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>In infrastructure and access services like LegionProxy, the risk may not be limited to an individual account. If the user uses the same email address for work projects or automation systems, attackers may see this as a starting point to access a broader technical infrastructure. Therefore, access keys, registered payment methods, team members, and account recovery information should also be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Cp>This record may not mean that the same purchase details exist for every user. Some rows may contain only basic account information, while others may provide a more detailed business context. Still, the combination of email, name, password, and purchase fields poses sufficient risk for both account takeover and financial phishing. Old and unused accounts should be closed, and notification settings should be kept enabled on active accounts.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2> \u003Cp>Affected users should carefully examine support, payment, license, balance, IP access, or account suspension messages coming under the name LegionProxy. Requests asking for verification codes, passwords, payment information, or login through a new connection should be considered suspicious. The most correct approach is to make passwords unique, monitor payment notifications, and handle technical service accounts along with personal email security.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Cp>Since proxy services are generally used by developers, marketing teams, data collection teams, or users performing technical operations, the impact of a breach can extend beyond personal accounts. If other infrastructure services are used with the same payment account or email address, attackers may be able to establish connections between them. Therefore, users should check not only their LegionProxy account but also the email, password, and payment methods registered with similar technical services.\u003C\u002Fp> \u003Cp>Purchase history can also provide indirect information about the user's service volume or purpose of use. This information can be used in messages such as fake corporate offers, fake upgrades, balance replenishment, or service interruption warnings. Especially in technical teams where multiple people use the same account, it should be predetermined who will approve payment and access requests.\u003C\u002Fp>","LegionProxy Data Breach (10.1 Thousand Reported Records)","LegionProxy Data Breach. 10.1 Thousand reported records are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Flegionproxy_io.webp",false,{"name":39,"sector":40,"country":16,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":16,"websiteStatus":16,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"LegionProxy","Proxy Service"]