[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f2y4i7d7tpe0dk":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":17,"affectedCount":17,"affectedCountStatus":18,"affectedCountLowerBound":19,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":21,"dataClasses":22,"description":28,"seoTitle":15,"seoTitleEn":29,"seoDescription":15,"seoDescriptionEn":30,"logoUrl":31,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":32,"isMalware":32,"company":33},"68e3266eda11adda4882526e","lexipol","Lexipol Data Breach","lexipol.com","2025-02-11T00:00:00.000Z","2025-03-19T01:07:39.000Z","2026-07-03T23:05:21.539Z","2026-07-18T23:53:13.333Z","Third party breach","",[],672546,"known",null,"unknown","High",[23,24,25,26,27],"Email addresses","Names","Passwords","Phone numbers","Usernames","\u003Cp>The Lexipol data breach is related to the exposure of user records and document context of the company providing public safety and policy management services in February 2025. The scope includes approximately 672,546 unique email addresses. This record was treated as a verified account breach with a public safety context; in order not to give the user a false perception of account, brand, or data field, the company, country, sector, website, and data class fields were individually checked. Due to the institutional and personnel context, the record was marked as sensitive data.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The text was stripped of old template headings and transferred to a structure that directly conveys risk, scope, and actions to the user. The website field was stored as lexipol.com; since the protocol was not added, the format that would cause https to appear twice on the link side was not preserved. The sector was corrected from retail to Public Safety Policy Management.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The data types seen in this record are email addresses, names, phone numbers, usernames, and passwords. It was assessed that the passwords are stored in formats such as MD5 or SHA-256; weak passwords are susceptible to offline attacks. These fields were evaluated individually; unverified payment cards, bank accounts, official IDs, private messages, health records, or additional profile fields were not added to the data class list.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Users associated with public safety institutions can be targeted with messages such as fake policy updates, training invitations, or document sharing. While an email address alone creates a risk of spam and phishing, when combined with names, phone numbers, addresses, IPs, birth dates, or professional information, it makes it easier for attackers to craft more personalized messages. Therefore, the risk assessment was conducted not only based on the number of records but also on the combined usability of the fields.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The scope was verified with the account 672,546 dated February 2025. While the verified data fields are preserved, the unconfirmed fields are excluded. Thus, the user is informed about the current record without being overly alarmed, but the real risk is not underestimated either.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Fields such as address, official ID, payment, or health data were not added because they were not verified; the incident was retained in the context of user records and associated documents. If there are other incidents resembling the same name as the record, they were not merged into a single large incident. Domain name, company name, and industry information were retained in the narrowest correct context possible; this also prevents the addition of duplicate or incorrectly associated breaches.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>User groups at risk are public safety personnel, agency representatives, and policy management users who have an account in Lexipol systems. Matched users should consider not only the account in the relevant service but also other accounts where the same email, username, or password pattern is used.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Phone and username information can make targeted messages that appear to be internal support or security notifications more convincing. For individuals registered with a corporate email address, the risk can extend beyond a personal account; attackers can send more convincing messages by using information such as name, role, phone number, address, purchase, gaming ID, or professional profile details. Therefore, users should not see the match as a problem limited to a single site.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should change their passwords, and organization administrators should implement session termination, mandatory password reset, and two-step verification measures. For records that have a password field, all accounts using the same password should be updated; for records without a password field, the focus should be on the risk of email, phone, and phishing notifications. In both cases, the email account should be protected with a strong and unique password.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Instead of clicking on the links in the message, the address of the relevant service should be typed manually or the record in a trusted password manager should be used. Messages such as verification codes received by phone, password reset requests, shipment, job offer, support, subscription, or security notifications should not be accepted without being verified through an independent channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Role-based access, multi-factor authentication, and regular account access reviews should be made mandatory in public safety services. Old accounts, unused phone and address fields, recurring usernames, and identical password patterns should be cleaned regularly. Users should use a unique password for each service and enable two-step verification wherever possible.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of service providers, minimal data retention, strong password protection, monitoring of access logs, deletion of unnecessary profile fields, and user notification after a breach are fundamental requirements. In sensitive sectors, the security of third-party systems directly affects the operational trust relationship. In such incidents, accurate scope communication is as important as technical remediation; exaggerated or incomplete information can mislead the user into taking incorrect action.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should first verify with their email address in this record. If a match is found, additional verification should be prioritized for password changes, session control, and support requests received via phone. The absence of a match does not completely rule out the reuse of old passwords or the use of different emails associated with the same service; therefore, critical accounts should be reviewed separately.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record has been verified and left as sensitive; the industry and tags have been aligned with the context of public safety. In this arrangement, data fields were left as English canonical classes, the description visible to the user was written in Turkish and original, unverified fields were not added, and the sensitivity flag was used only when supported by the risk context.\u003C\u002Fp>","Lexipol Data Breach (672.5 Thousand Reported Records)","Lexipol Data Breach. 672.5 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Flexipol_com.webp",false,{"name":34,"sector":35,"country":36,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":15,"websiteStatus":15,"websiteCheckedAt":19},"Lexipol","Public Safety Policy Management","United States"]