[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3tehf9yctk13z":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"publishedAt":13,"modifiedDate":14,"contentUpdatedAt":15,"source":16,"sourceUrl":17,"sourceUrls":18,"pwnCount":19,"affectedCount":19,"affectedCountStatus":20,"affectedCountLowerBound":13,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":22,"availableLocales":23,"translations":25,"severity":28,"dataClasses":29,"description":32,"seoTitle":33,"seoDescription":34,"logoUrl":35,"isVerified":36,"isSensitive":36,"isSpamList":36,"isMalware":36,"company":37},"6a45ce86d29bdbaf91ce5f4c","MapExpert","MapExpert Alleged Data Exposure","mapexpert","mapexpert.com.ua","2018-08-01T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-02T02:35:50.005Z",null,"2026-09-17T16:27:41.515Z","2026-09-17T16:55:55.679Z","Third party breach","",[],10967,"known","email_identifiers","en",[22,24],"tr",{"en":26,"tr":27},{"slug":9},{"slug":9},"Medium",[30,31],"Email addresses","Passwords","\u003Cp>MapExpert data breach is a security incident dated August 2018, investigated within the Ukraine-based mapping site associated with satellite imagery, remote sensing, land monitoring, environmental analysis and GIS training associated with the mapexpert.com.ua domain. This record was added because it is supported as a unique incident affecting 10,967 accounts. Email addresses and passwords fields were kept in the record; Data types that are unsupported, conflicting, or only indirectly passed are excluded to avoid misleading the user.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>In the verification evaluation, the mapexpert.com.ua domain name was verified as of August 2018, with 10,967 records and email addresses together with supporting plain text password fields. This approach is especially important in legacy forum, e-commerce, sporting event, gaming community, technical supply and mapping site registrations; because sites with similar names, closed domains or redirects may appear to be the same event. When creating the MapExpert record, the name, domain name, number of records, event time and data class were evaluated together.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Since the password storage format is supported as plain text, the risk of account takeover is direct and high in case of password reuse. Risk of password duplication spreading to other professional accounts due to technical education and mapping users using business or academic email. Therefore, this record was written in detail not only to list the event name, but also to help the user understand which passwords to change, which accounts to check, and which suspicious messages to pay attention to.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The visible data classes in this event are limited to email addresses, passwords. Map file, project data, location history, payment, phone or physical address fields were not added because they are not supported. This limitation is a conscious choice: showing too much space in data breach logs can cause users to mistook accounts as risky or miss passwords that are actually risky.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Limits\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>mapexpert.com.ua domain could not be verified as a reliably running active service in current checks or appeared to be separated from its former brand context; therefore the record was kept as retired or inaccessible service. Website status does not eliminate the security impact at the time the event occurred. Even if the old domain redirects to a different page today, appears to be parked, or the service has changed, leaked credentials can still be used in automated retries years later due to password reuse.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>At-Risk User Groups\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The first check for the user is whether the email address associated with MapExpert is also used in other services. If the same email and password pair is repeated on other sites, the risk is not limited to a single account. Especially having the same password in e-mail box, social media, shopping, game, forum, job application and corporate portal accounts increases the chain of account takeover.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Checking whether the same password is used in GIS, education, academic and business accounts. Making small variations when changing passwords is not enough; For example, old passwords with a year, exclamation or site name added to the end can be easily attempted by automated attack tools. The best approach is to generate a unique and long password for each account, turn on multi-factor authentication where possible, and review old recovery email addresses.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>From an institutional perspective, user tables, outdated PHP applications and plain text password storage risks should be regularly audited on these registration, mapping and training sites. The impact of a data breach doesn't just end with the leak of the user table; If the same passwords are used in a VPN, admin panel, customer portal, CMS, cloud storage or email account, the incident may turn into a risk of lateral movement and unauthorized access.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>When performing the risk assessment for MapExpert, the password storage format was also taken into account: plain text password. Plain text passwords pose the highest practical risk because they are directly usable. Tables containing MD5, salted MD5, old forum software hashes or salt information can be tested with modern hardware even if they are not plain text.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>This record understands the scope of the event through different names such as MapExpert data breach, GIS site password leak, mapping platform security, plain text password risk. was designed to make it easier. The goal is for anyone experiencing a MapExpert breach to clearly see what happened, what data types are validated, what fields are excluded, and what security steps they need to take.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Similar names have been kept separate to reduce false positives. Generic collections not associated with mapexpert.com.ua, databases with similar names of other brands or records that remain only at the level of a single line claim were not combined with this event. This distinction prevents repeated breaches and ensures that the user actually encounters the relevant domain name in the list.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The historical nature of the incident is also important. Security architecture, password storage standards, and forum or web application maintenance practices as of August 2018 may differ from today's expectations; but this does not diminish the impact of old recordings. Email and password pairs from old breaches can still be used in account takeover attempts by trying them on new services.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The number shown to the user in the MapExpert record was kept at 10,967. The number of registrations does not have to equal the exact number of users; Some datasets may contain duplicate rows, test accounts, or missing fields. Despite this, the confirmed total is a sufficient indicator to tell about the magnitude of the incident and the security priority that users should take into account.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Immediate Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>This record has been prepared for security awareness purposes. Users are not encouraged to search, download or share leaked data. What needs to be done is to increase the security of the relevant accounts, remove duplicate passwords, close suspicious sessions, update recovery options and, if possible, make all accounts unique with a password manager.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Even though the data types seem limited in the MapExpert incident, e-mail address, username and password alone may be sufficient for the attacker. Email address can be used for identity pinning, password reset attempts, fake notifications, campaign emails and targeted social engineering. If the password is reused, it becomes a direct login attempt.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The practical checklist for account holders is this: remember the old password used in the relevant service, replace all accounts with the same or similar password, check the login history on the main email account, turn on two-step verification and leave the password nowhere. Do not reuse. The checklist for institutions is to close access to old user tables, audit password hash policies, and generate alarms against credential stuffing attempts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>While preparing this text, brands outside the event, general collections, and unproven data fields were deliberately not included in the narrative. The purpose of the MapExpert record is to clarify the individual breach incident, show users associated with mapexpert.com.ua what to check, and highlight verified domains on the data breach page instead of unnecessary source attribution.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The second level of risk for MapExpert is that the leaked credential matches other data sets. If the same e-mail address has been used before in forums, shopping, job applications, games or social media accounts, the attacker can guess not only the password, but also the person's interests and account habits.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>After renewing the password on accounts connected to the mapexpert.com.ua domain, the old passwords saved in the browser will also be available. should be cleaned. If a password manager is used, all records where the same password occurs should be searched and each should be made independent. Especially in the context of plain text or a weak hash, it is possible for the attacker to attempt the password directly without having to guess it.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>For security teams, this record indicates the need for domain-based matching in breached credential tracking efforts. Just searching for the company name may not be enough; Old domain names, www usage, current forwarding domain name and users' e-mail extensions should be checked together. In this way, real risks are captured and similar named but unrelated records are not accidentally merged.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The data class language used in this record was kept deliberately simple: email addresses, passwords. Users need to understand what is being exposed without getting bogged down in technical detail. On the other hand, the method of storing the password was also mentioned because it determined the practical impact of the event. The plaintext password statement explains that the incident is not just an email list and should be evaluated from an account security perspective.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The bottom line for people looking for information about this incident is that a single breach record is an opportunity to reexamine the entire account security history. Passwords used in old services are often forgotten; But leaked data sets are not forgotten. Therefore, closing old accounts, uniqueizing passwords and protecting the main email account is a priority.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Registration Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The record structure was kept clean: a plain domain name was used in the website area, the logo image was matched to the record, the description was kept limited to the scope of the event, and the risk of duplicate registration was reduced with a single record structure. This layout is important to avoid incorrect link appearance on the public registration page and to prevent the same event from recurring under different URLs.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>As a result, MapExpert data breach; 10,967 records, email addresses, passwords, and plaintext passwords during August 2018 are an account security incident that must be addressed with context. This page has been prepared so that the user can take action quickly, without exaggerating the existence of the incident, adding unverified claims, and creating duplicate records.\u003C\u002Fp>","MapExpert Alleged Data Exposure (11 Thousand Email Identifiers)","MapExpert Alleged Data Exposure. 11 Thousand email identifiers are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fmapexpert.jpg",false,{"name":7,"sector":38,"country":39,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":17,"websiteStatus":17,"websiteCheckedAt":13},"Mapping \u002F GIS \u002F Remote Sensing","Ukraine"]