[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3russpyxhxth":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":20,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":22,"dataClasses":23,"description":28,"seoTitle":29,"seoTitleEn":30,"seoDescription":29,"seoDescriptionEn":31,"logoUrl":32,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":33,"isSpamList":33,"isMalware":33,"company":34},"68e3266eda11adda4882529a","Mappery","Mappery Data Breach","mappery","mappery.com","2018-12-11T00:00:00.000Z","2018-12-18T16:19:50.000Z","2026-07-18T23:53:54.467Z","Mapping website breach","https:\u002F\u002Fdatabreach.com\u002Fbreach\u002Fmappery-2018",[15,17],"https:\u002F\u002Fmappery.com\u002F",205242,"known",null,"unknown","High",[24,25,26,27],"Email addresses","Geographic locations","Passwords","Usernames","\u003Cp>The Mappery data breach is a verified account security incident affecting 205,242 unique email addresses tracked as of December 11, 2018, on the online service aimed at map sharing and cartography enthusiasts. The types of data recorded include email addresses, geographic locations, usernames, and password hashes stored in unsalted SHA-1 format. This incident indicates that information stored in map- and location-focused accounts poses risks not only in terms of session security but also regarding privacy and profile matching.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The main risk for Mappery users is the exposure of the combination of email and username along with geographic location information. When a person's map interests, location preferences, or past shares are matched with other profiles, more convincing phishing messages and targeted scam scenarios can arise. On the password side, the verified information is not plain text passwords but unsalted SHA-1 password hashes. This distinction is important; it should not be said that every password can be read directly, but because unsalted SHA-1 is an old and weak storage method, short or reused passwords pose a serious risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Email addresses visible on Mappery records can be used for fake account alerts, map download notifications, and targeted phishing messages. Usernames may lead to profiles being linked if the same nickname is used on other sites. The geographic location field can provide a clue about the places the user is interested in or the region associated with their account. This information alone does not mean the full address, but when combined with other fields, it increases the privacy risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Password hashes are the most critical technical area of the record. Unsalted SHA-1 is considered weak according to current security standards; attackers can especially carry out offline attempts on short passwords, those containing dictionary words, or passwords previously seen in other breaches. If the same password is used on other accounts, a Mappery breach can enable login attempts on email, forum, map, social media, or work accounts. Therefore, the risk should not be seen as limited to the Mappery account alone.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The verified scope consists of 205,242 unique email addresses, a breach date of December 11, 2018, an addition date of December 18, 2018, and four types of data: email addresses, geographical locations, passwords, and usernames. The record is associated with a map sharing site. In this record, phone number, physical address, payment card, bank account, official ID, real name, or private message content does not appear as a verified field.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The password field should be explicitly restricted. The verified statement is an unsalted SHA-1 password hash; therefore, it should not be claimed that all passwords are in readable text. Nevertheless, since unsalted SHA-1 is a weak approach, reused passwords carry a high risk. The main risks to be communicated to the user should be addressed around account compromise, password reuse, geographical profile matching, phishing, and privacy loss.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Users at the highest risk are those who reuse the password they use for their Mappery account on other services. The risk of profile matching increases for people who open map communities, forums, social media, work accounts, or email accounts with the same email and username. For accounts that have geographical location information, sending the user fake messages themed around a specific region, route, map, or location can become more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Users who share maps or are known for old location content should also be careful about privacy. Geographic areas should not be treated like a full address, but they can give clues about past interests or movement context. When this information is combined with a username and email, it makes it easier for attackers to generate more personalized messages. Therefore, not only passwords but also map profiles and visible user information should be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If you see a match in the Mappery record, the first step is to change the password used on this account and all other accounts using the same password to unique passwords. Email accounts, social media, forums, map services, and payment-linked services should be checked as a priority. Using a password manager to create long and random passwords for each service reduces the risk of reuse. It should also be checked whether there are unknown sessions, new recovery addresses, or unexpected security notifications on the accounts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>This protection should be enabled on accounts that support two-factor authentication. The email account should be especially well protected, because the password reset process for many services goes through email. Do not click directly on links in messages coming under the name of Mappery or map sharing service; open the domain yourself to check the account. Do not respond to messages that ask for your password, recovery code, or additional security information.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>For long-term protection, map, hobby, and community accounts should be separated from critical accounts. The main email address should only be used for essential services, while a separate email address can be preferred for community and location-focused accounts. Not using the same username on every platform makes it harder to link different profiles together. A password manager makes it easy to find previously reused passwords and generate strong passwords for each account.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Old maps and community profiles should be reviewed at regular intervals. Unused accounts should be closed, unnecessary personal information should not be kept on active accounts, and visible location content should be carefully selected. Since areas such as geographic location, username, and email can be used for profile matching even years later, the impact of old violations does not completely disappear. For this reason, records like Mappery should be handled with a permanent account security habit.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If you see a match in a Mappery breach, first list the accounts opened with your affected email address. Then determine which services use the same or similar password and complete the changes starting with the most critical accounts. If you use your username on other platforms, assess whether linking these profiles poses a privacy risk. Terminate old sessions, update recovery options, and keep security alerts enabled.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>This record should not be considered as a phone, physical address, or payment card leak; the verified risk comes from the combination of email, geographic location, username, and password hash. Although the Mappery breach dates back to 2018, the risk can still persist today if the same password has been reused for years. The best course of action is to make passwords unique, secure the email account strongly, and be cautious of fake map or account support messages.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Mappery Data Breach (205.2 Thousand Reported Records)","Mappery Data Breach. 205.2 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Geographic locations, Passwords. Review the scope, risks…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fmappery_com.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":35,"country":36,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":29,"websiteStatus":29,"websiteCheckedAt":20},"Mapping \u002F Cartography Community","Unknown"]