[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f1gviy57ce56vv":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":9,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":16,"affectedCount":16,"affectedCountStatus":17,"affectedCountLowerBound":18,"affectedCountUnit":19,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":20,"dataClasses":21,"description":35,"seoTitle":9,"seoTitleEn":36,"seoDescription":9,"seoDescriptionEn":37,"logoUrl":38,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":39,"isMalware":39,"company":40},"68e3266eda11adda4882529d","master-deeds","Master Deeds Data Breach","","2017-03-14T00:00:00.000Z","2017-10-18T11:01:46.000Z","2026-07-03T23:13:31.112Z","2026-07-18T23:53:58.472Z","Third party breach",[],2257930,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34],"Dates of birth","Deceased statuses","Email addresses","Employers","Ethnicities","Genders","Government issued IDs","Home ownership statuses","Job titles","Names","Nationalities","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","\u003Cp>The Master Deeds data breach is related to the exposure of a backup of a database containing extensive identity and public record information of South African residents, which occurred in March 2017. The scope is 2,257,930 unique email addresses; the total number of individual records may be much larger. This record was treated as an identity and public record dataset not linked to a domain name; the company, country, sector, website, and data type fields were rechecked. Fields such as official ID, ethnicity, address, and death status caused the record to be marked as sensitive data.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The text was rewritten to directly explain the risk and actions to the user. The website field was kept blank; a format that would cause https to appear twice on the connection side was not used because no protocol was added. The company website was left blank because the registration cannot be verified as a single domain violation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data seen in this record are birth dates, death status, email addresses, employers, ethnic origin, gender, official identification numbers, home ownership status, job titles, names, nationalities, phone numbers, and physical addresses. Since there is no password field, account takeover is not a concern, but identity misuse and personal profile risk are prominent. Unverified payment card, bank account, private message, official ID, health record, or additional profile fields were not added to the data class list; only supported fields were kept.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Official identity and address fields can be used for fraud, fake applications, bypassing identity verification steps, and personalized threat messages. An email address alone poses a risk of unwanted messages; when combined with phone number, address, IP, date of birth, photo, ID number, or device tracking data, it becomes easier for an attacker to produce messages personalized for the user. Therefore, the risk is evaluated not only based on the number of records but also on the usability of the data together.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The scope was verified with the March 2017 dataset and 2.25 million email addresses. Verified fields were retained while unconfirmed fields were excluded. The incident was not combined with other brands, similarly named records, or events from different periods of the same company.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Since the responsible institution was not definitively established, the domain and website fields were left empty; the explanation was limited to the context of South African identity data. This approach prevents the addition of duplicate breaches and shows incorrect institutional responsibility to the user. The domain name, company name, and sector information were kept in the narrowest accurate context possible; where there was uncertainty, the verified flag or website field was set accordingly.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>At-risk user groups may include individuals living in South Africa or listed in past public records, family members related to deceased persons, and citizens with property records. Matched users should also evaluate other accounts where they use the same email, phone, username, or password pattern outside of the relevant account.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The deceased person's status and family context can make frauds themed around inheritance, property, insurance, or official procedures more convincing. If there is a context of corporate email, child or family account, public record, gaming identity, literacy community, monitoring software, or professional service, the social engineering risk may increase. Users should not accept details that appear correct about themselves as a sign of trust.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should verify official transaction, debt, property, or inheritance-related requests coming from individuals who know their identity and address through an independent institution. For records with a password field, all accounts using the same password should be updated; for records without a password field, the focus should be on risks related to phone, email, fake notifications, and identity matching.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Instead of clicking on the links in the message, the address of the relevant service should be typed manually or the record in a trusted password manager should be used. Messages regarding cargo, support, game rewards, account warnings, public records, security notifications, document sharing, or subscription renewal should not be accepted without verification through an independent channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>For data containing public records, monitoring identity theft, checking credit activities, and regularly tracking official applications are important in the long term. Users should regularly clean up old accounts, unnecessary profile fields, duplicate usernames, and outdated phone and address information. A unique password for each service and two-step verification wherever possible should be the basic rule.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of service providers, data minimization, strong password protection, monitoring of access logs, deletion of unnecessary fields, and readiness of user notification processes are required. In large datasets similar to public records, access control, backup security, and auditing of open web directories are critical. Accurate scope description is also part of the security effort; exaggerated or incomplete information can mislead the user into taking the wrong action.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should first check this record with their email address. If a match is found, it should be considered that official identity, address, phone, and employer information could be at risk, and extra care should be taken in identity verification processes. The absence of a match does not completely rule out the use of different emails or the reuse of old passwords; critical accounts should also be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record has been verified and left as sensitive; it was not presented as a specific brand account violation. In this arrangement, the data fields were left as English canonical classes, the description visible to the user was written in Turkish and original, unverified fields were not added, and the sensitivity flag was used only when supported by the risk context.\u003C\u002Fp>","Master Deeds Data Breach (2.3 Million Reported Records)","Master Deeds Data Breach. 2.3 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Dates of birth, Deceased statuses, Email addresses. Review the scope…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fmaster_deeds.webp",false,{"name":41,"sector":42,"country":43,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":9,"websiteStatus":9,"websiteCheckedAt":18},"Master Deeds","Public Records \u002F Identity Data","South Africa"]