[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f1mv2ap32jrl4o":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":10,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":17,"affectedCount":17,"affectedCountStatus":18,"affectedCountLowerBound":19,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":21,"dataClasses":22,"description":26,"seoTitle":10,"seoTitleEn":27,"seoDescription":10,"seoDescriptionEn":28,"logoUrl":29,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":30,"isMalware":30,"company":31},"68e3266eda11adda488252a1","mc2data","MC2 Data Data Breach","mc2-data","","2024-08-18T00:00:00.000Z","2024-12-15T17:47:05.000Z","2026-07-03T23:13:31.112Z","2026-07-18T23:54:01.480Z","Third party breach",[],2122280,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[23,24,25],"Email addresses","Names","Passwords","\u003Cp>The MC2 Data data breach is associated with subscriber records related to the data collection and background check service remaining accessible without a password during the August 2024 period. The scope is approximately 2,122,280 subscriber records. This record was treated as a data broker service account breach; company, country, industry, website, and data class fields were re-checked. The website field was left blank because the company provided services under multiple brand names.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The text was rewritten to directly convey risk and action to the user. The website field was kept empty; a format that would cause https to appear twice on the connection side was not used because the protocol was not added. The sector was shifted from finance to the context of data aggregator and background checks; it was opened due to the sensitive flag, password, and the nature of the service's data.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data seen in this record are email addresses, names, and passwords. It was assessed that the passwords are stored as salted SHA-256 hashes; the risk continues for weak or reused passwords. Unverified payment cards, bank accounts, private messages, official IDs, health records, or additional profile fields were not added to the data class list; only supported fields were kept.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In the context of the background check service, attackers may be facilitated in sending messages that appear to be official inquiries, identity checks, or subscription messages to the user. An email address alone poses a risk of unsolicited messages; when combined with a phone number, address, IP, date of birth, photo, ID number, or device tracking data, it becomes easier for an attacker to generate personalized messages for the user. Therefore, the risk is evaluated not only based on the number of records but also on the usability of the data together.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The scope was verified with 2.12 million subscriber records as of August 2024. Confirmed areas were preserved, while unconfirmed areas were excluded. The incident was not combined with other brands, records with similar names, or events from different periods of the same company.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Claims of broader personal data were not added to the canonical data classes of this record; the record was limited to subscriber email, name, and password fields. This approach prevents duplicate breach entries and showing incorrect organizational responsibility to the user. Domain name, company name, and sector information were kept in the narrowest accurate context possible; where there was uncertainty, a verified flag or website field was set accordingly.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>User groups at risk may be individuals who have subscription accounts under MC2 Data or associated brand names. Matching users should also evaluate other accounts where they use the same email, phone number, username, or password pattern outside of the relevant account.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Account takeover attempts become more serious for people who use the same password on other professional, financial, or email accounts. If there is a corporate email, child or family account, public record, gaming identity, literacy community, tracking software, or professional service context, the social engineering risk may increase. Users should not accept details that seem correct about themselves as a sign of trust.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should change the password they use on their MC2 Data-related accounts and all accounts where the same password is used. In records with a password field, all accounts using the same password should be updated; in records without a password field, focus should be on the risk of phone, email, fake notifications, and identity matching.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Instead of clicking on the links in the message, the address of the relevant service should be typed manually or the record in a trusted password manager should be used. Messages regarding cargo, support, game rewards, account warnings, public records, security notifications, document sharing, or subscription renewal should not be accepted without verification through an independent channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Separate email, unique password, and minimal profile information should be used for data intermediary and background check services. Users should regularly clean up old accounts, unnecessary profile fields, duplicate usernames, and outdated phone and address information. A unique password for each service and two-factor authentication wherever possible should be the basic rule.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of service providers, data minimization, strong password protection, monitoring of access logs, deletion of unnecessary fields, and having user notification processes ready are required. For data intermediary companies, access control and detection of passwordless services are basic security requirements. Accurate scope description is also part of the security work; exaggerated or incomplete information can mislead the user to take incorrect action.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should first check this record with their email address. If a match is found, it should be assumed that the name and password fields may be at risk, and accounts using the same password should be updated first. Not finding a match does not completely rule out the use of different emails or the reuse of old passwords; critical accounts should also be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record has been verified and left as sensitive; unverified extensive personal fields were not added. In this arrangement, data fields were left as English canonical classes, the description visible to the user was written in Turkish and original, unverified fields were not added, and the sensitivity flag was used only when supported by the risk context.\u003C\u002Fp>","MC2 Data Data Breach (2.1 Million Reported Records)","MC2 Data Data Breach. 2.1 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fmc2data.webp",false,{"name":32,"sector":33,"country":34,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":10,"websiteStatus":10,"websiteCheckedAt":19},"MC2 Data","Data Aggregator \u002F Background Checks","United States"]