[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$foqpx68gp419h":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":11,"contentUpdatedAt":12,"source":13,"sourceUrl":14,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":19,"affectedCount":19,"affectedCountStatus":20,"affectedCountLowerBound":21,"affectedCountUnit":22,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":23,"dataClasses":24,"description":29,"seoTitle":30,"seoTitleEn":31,"seoDescription":30,"seoDescriptionEn":32,"logoUrl":33,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":34,"isSpamList":34,"isMalware":34,"company":35},"68e3266eda11adda488252db","myrepospace","myRepoSpace Data Breach","myrepospace.com","2015-07-06T00:00:00.000Z","2015-07-08T08:44:51.000Z","2026-07-18T23:55:05.122Z","Verified third-party breach record and contemporaneous community reporting","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.reddit.com\u002Fr\u002Fjailbreak\u002Fcomments\u002F3c9qr1\u002Fdiscussion_myrepospace_user_data_leaked\u002F",[14,16,17,18],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.reddit.com\u002Fr\u002Fjailbreak\u002Fcomments\u002F3wodqn\u002Fquestion_what_happened_to_myrepospacecom\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.acumin.co.uk\u002Fnews\u002Fhigh-profile-hackings-of-2015-myrepospace\u002F899\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fmyrepospace.com\u002F",252751,"known",null,"unknown","High",[25,26,27,28],"Email addresses","IP addresses","Passwords","Usernames","\u003Cp>The myRepoSpace data breach is a verified account security incident recorded with the users' data from myrepospace.com, associated with the Cydia repository service, being compromised on July 6, 2015, and circulating online shortly thereafter. The Cydia ecosystem is based on a distribution model used to add app and package repositories on jailbroken iOS devices; therefore, individuals with a myRepoSpace account are not just typical social network users but members of a technical community interested in device customization and package management. The verified record includes 252,751 affected accounts, with email addresses, IP addresses, passwords, and usernames.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The significance of this incident in terms of user security arises from the fact that the password and username fields are visible along with IP addresses. An email and username can link a person's identities across different forums, repositories, and developer accounts; the IP address, on the other hand, reinforces the network context during registration or session periods. The listing of the password field provides attackers with direct material for trial, even if it is old, to attempt the same password on other services. Therefore, even if the myRepoSpace account is no longer used, the risk continues if the same email and password combination exists on other accounts.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The data types that can be verified in the myRepoSpace record are email addresses, IP addresses, passwords, and usernames. When these four fields are considered together, not only the login information of the user account but also the online identity and technical community history become visible. The email address serves as an account recovery and notification channel; the username may be repeated across different forums; the IP address can provide approximate network or service provider context; and the password, if reused, poses the most direct risk of account compromise.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The risk due to the password field should not be considered limited to myRepoSpace alone. If the user has reused the same password for their email account, developer account, forum profile, package repository management, social media, or cloud service, old data becomes functional in new attack attempts. Attackers do not only try old password values exactly; they also test new passwords derived from the same root. Matching IP addresses and usernames particularly increases the risk of extracting personal profiles and generating targeted phishing messages in technical communities.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The verified scope of this record is 252,751 accounts. The event date should be recorded as July 6, 2015, and the date of addition to the source indexes should be recorded as July 8, 2015. These two dates are separate from the technical update time in the system in 2026; the technical update date should not be presented as the date the breach occurred or the date it first appeared in the external source. Data classes are also limited to the verified list: email addresses, IP addresses, passwords, and usernames.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sources support that the incident occurred in the context of the Cydia repository and that the data circulated publicly. On the other hand, it is not correct to make a definite claim that payment information, identification documents, physical addresses, private messages, or device contents were leaked. myRepoSpace was a service where different users hosted their own Cydia repositories; however, this record only covers account data fields. Content files, package details, or in-device data should not be added to verified data fields.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The first group at risk consists of Cydia and jailbreak community users who opened a myrepospace.com account before 2015 or around that time. These people may not have used the account for years; however, the risk persists if the combination of their old email address, username, and password has been reused on other services. Particularly, people who are developers, theme creators, package repository managers, or technical forum users may have the same username associated with multiple platforms.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The second group consists of users who reuse the same password across more critical accounts, such as email accounts or developer services. Compromising the email account can trigger the password reset chain on other services. The third group includes people who register for personal technical community services with their corporate or school email. This match alone does not mean access to the institution's system; however, it can help an attacker prepare messages that are personalized, use technical jargon, and appear more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Users appearing in the myRepoSpace record should first make sure that they have not used their old password on any account on this service. If the same password or very similar derivatives are still being used, unique passwords should be set for email, developer accounts, cloud storage, social media, forum, and package repository profiles. Adding a year, symbol, or a small suffix to the password is not enough; a secure choice is new, long, random values stored with a password manager.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The email account must definitely be protected separately. Multi-factor authentication should be enabled, recovery email and phone information should be checked, unfamiliar sessions should be closed, and automatic forwarding rules should be reviewed. Messages such as fake security alerts associated with technical communities, package repository update messages, or old account notifications should be handled with care. Instead of clicking the link, access to the service through a known address should be preferred.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The myRepoSpace incident shows that seemingly small technical community accounts can also generate lasting risk. Users should use separate passwords for every forum, repository, developer tool, and social service; they should assess the privacy impact of repeating the same username across different identity domains. Old accounts should be reviewed regularly, unused profiles should be closed, and account recovery information should be kept up to date.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of organizations, this record serves as a reminder of the targeted phishing risk created by employees using corporate email on their personal technical community accounts. Security teams should conduct breached password checks, multi-factor authentication, risky session alerts, and employee awareness training together. Old password habits used in developer or technical teams are particularly important because the same password may have been carried over to developer tools, package repositories, or source code platforms.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>A user who sees the myRepoSpace result on LeakData should treat this record as a 2015 dated verified account data warning. The result includes email addresses, IP addresses, passwords, and usernames on a scale of 252,751 accounts. The record does not mean that the device has been compromised or personal files have been leaked; the main risk is trying the old account information on other services and establishing profile matching from the username.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The practical action sequence is clear: first, secure the email account, then update all services where the same password may have been used, and afterward check forums and developer profiles opened with the same username. Even if the old myRepoSpace account is no longer accessible, the password family should be completely abandoned. If registration was done with a corporate email, the result should be shared with the security team; the monitoring level should be increased for potential targeted messages and unknown sessions.\u003C\u002Fp>","","myRepoSpace Data Breach (252.8 Thousand Reported Records)","myRepoSpace Data Breach. 252.8 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, IP addresses, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fmyrepospace_com.webp",false,{"name":36,"sector":37,"country":38,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":30,"websiteStatus":30,"websiteCheckedAt":21},"myRepoSpace","Cydia Repository \u002F Jailbreak Community","Global"]