[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fqaqlblzr88ra":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":7,"slug":8,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":11,"contentUpdatedAt":12,"source":13,"sourceUrl":14,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":16,"affectedCount":16,"affectedCountStatus":17,"affectedCountLowerBound":18,"affectedCountUnit":19,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":20,"dataClasses":21,"description":24,"seoTitle":9,"seoTitleEn":25,"seoDescription":9,"seoDescriptionEn":26,"logoUrl":27,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":28,"isSpamList":28,"isMalware":28,"company":29},"68e3266eda11adda488252dd","Naz Credential List","nazapi","","2023-09-20T00:00:00.000Z","2024-01-17T13:24:27.000Z","2026-07-18T23:54:55.826Z","Verified breach record","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.troyhunt.com\u002Finside-the-massive-naz-api-credential-stuffing-list\u002F",[14],70840771,"known",null,"email_identifiers","Critical",[22,23],"Email addresses","Passwords","\u003Cp>The Naz credential list data breach is associated with a large-scale collection of credentials that was leaked in September 2023. The incident involves 70,840,771 unique email addresses and a very high number of password values. The dataset consists of a combination of email and plain text password pairs that circulated for credential stuffing purposes along with stealer log records. Therefore, the risk is much broader than a single company account: if the same email address and password were used on other services, attackers could use this information in automated login attempts, targeted phishing attacks, and account takeover attempts. The confirmed data classes are email addresses and passwords.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The main risk in this situation is that the email address and password appear on the same line or within the same context. Plain text password pairs pose a more direct risk than password hash values; because an attacker can try the same information on different services without having to wait for a cracking process. In the dataset, some lines are associated with a specific service name, while some lines appear only as a credential pair. This mixed nature causes users to not always know which account was the original source. The risk is very high for people who reuse passwords; for those who use unique passwords, phishing and password reset messages targeting the same email address are more prominent.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The violation date is tracked as September 2023, and the listing date is January 17, 2024. The main scope on the LeakData side is 70,840,771 unique email addresses. The verified data classes are email addresses and passwords; address, phone, payment card, or identity document fields are not among the verified classes of this search record. Since the dataset is not linked to a single domain name, a company website or country domain is not represented as a specific institution. This distinction is important: the incident should be treated as a large collection of credential pairs from various sources, rather than a breach of a particular brand's system. The search result indicates whether the user's email address is included in this collection.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The highest risk applies to people who use the same password across multiple services, do not change their old passwords for a long time, do not use a password manager, and do not enable multi-factor authentication. Those who use their work email for personal services, or open social media, gaming, shopping, cloud storage, mailbox, or financial service accounts with the same email, are at even greater risk. If an email address appears in the data set, this does not definitively indicate which service was the original source; however, it shows that at least one password history associated with that email may have fallen into the hands of attackers. For those using a corporate domain, the same risk can extend to company account attempts and fake security notifications.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Users who notice a match should first secure the most critical services such as email accounts, password manager vaults, financial accounts, and work accounts. Passwords should be changed on all accounts where the same or similar password is used. A unique and long password should be chosen for each service, and multi-factor authentication should be enabled wherever possible. Password reset messages, security alerts, account lock notifications, and unexpected login alerts should be verified through the official website without clicking any links. Old passwords stored in notebooks, browser records, or emails should be cleaned up. Corporate users should report to the security team if a match is seen with the work domain.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>In such credential collections, the persistent risk arises from password reuse. Users should generate unique passwords for each service with a password manager, gradually remove old and weak passwords, keep recovery options in their email accounts up to date, and periodically review their login history. Organizations should use breach monitoring for employee domains, controls that prevent password reuse, mandatory multi-factor authentication, and alert processes for unusual login attempts. Password reset processes alone are not sufficient; it should be assumed that attackers try compromised old passwords on different services. Training, technical audits, and rapid notification together provide a stronger defense.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>You can check for a match with the Naz credential list data breach by querying your email address on LeakData. If there is a match, assume that the incident may not be related to a single service and strengthen your password security starting with the most critical accounts. Do not use the same password or similar password patterns across different services. Multi-factor authentication, session history checks, recovery email inspections, and removal of old device authorizations should be your priority steps. If your email account is not strong, your other accounts are also at risk; therefore, securing the email account first is the most logical order. These steps reduce the likelihood that the data in the collection will be used for account testing and targeted phishing.\u003C\u002Fp>","Naz Credential List (70.8 Million Email Identifiers)","Naz Credential List. 70.8 Million email identifiers were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and protective steps.","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fnaz_api.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":30,"country":31,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":9,"websiteStatus":9,"websiteCheckedAt":18},"Credential stuffing and stealer logs","Global"]