[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f30ilcbbv8tphh":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":21,"availableLocales":22,"translations":24,"severity":27,"dataClasses":28,"description":32,"seoTitle":33,"seoDescription":34,"logoUrl":35,"isVerified":36,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":36,"isMalware":36,"company":37},"6a45552a7917b184e1ce5f47","passionsnetwork","PassionsNetwork Alleged Data Exposure","passionsnetwork.com","2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-01T17:58:01.826Z",null,"2026-09-17T16:27:41.515Z","2026-07-19T00:04:00.963Z","Third party breach","",[],825802,"known","email_identifiers","en",[21,23],"tr",{"en":25,"tr":26},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"High",[29,30,31],"Email addresses","Passwords","Usernames","\u003Cp>The PassionsNetwork data breach record is a security incident that came to light in early 2017 and is associated with approximately 826,000 records. The record, linked to a network of dating and interest communities, includes email, username, and password fields. This statement has been prepared to clarify which data fields of the user may be at risk, the verification limits of the incident, and the applicable security measures.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Membership itself can have sensitive consequences in the context of acquaintance; the password field also increases the risk of account takeover. Only data classes consistent with the available records are used in the text; unverified technical details, different events, or similarly named services are not presented as definite information under this record. Thus, the user can see the real risks without exaggeration but without leaving anything out.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data listed in this record are: email addresses, passwords, and usernames. When an email and username are associated with a social networking membership, they can pose a risk to privacy and targeted blackmail. When used together, these fields can make fake notifications, account recovery, targeted searches, identity matching, or fraud attempts more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Because the password field is present, individuals who use the same password on different social or email accounts are particularly at risk. Even in records without a password, fields such as phone, address, IP, device information, work profile, membership, or physical location can alone create significant risk. If there is a password or password-like field, it should also be checked whether the same information is repeated across different services.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The record is limited to approximately 826 thousand accounts associated with the domain passionsnetwork.com. The incident is classified as an unverified record. The scope has been written by separately evaluating the domain, sector, country, number of accounts, data classes, and the potential overlap with similar incidents. Data types not listed have not been shown as if they were available to the user.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Since verification is limited, the text is not structured as a definitive company statement, but sensitivity is maintained due to the context of introduction. In records with limited verification, the text is not structured as a definitive company statement. In records that may be duplicate or resemble a sub-event of another brand, this distinction is indirectly shown to the user and data fields are not unnecessarily expanded.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Members of PassionsNetwork who use the same username on different dating or social networks and users who repeat their passwords are at risk. The main risk for these individuals is that the leaked data is matched with information used on other accounts. If the same email, phone, username, IP, address, social profile, or password is repeated on different accounts, the attack surface increases.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The context of meeting can be used in fake messages, profile verification, private membership, or social engineering attempts involving threats. Media, real estate, telecommunications, logistics, gaming, video, Discord services, dating platforms, and professional data contexts produce different risks. The user should consider not only the data fields but also which service context they are associated with.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should change all accounts where they use the same password and check for suspicious sessions in their email accounts. If the password or password-like field is listed, users should make changes in all accounts where they use the same or similar password, use a unique password, and enable multi-factor authentication where possible. The email account should also be checked.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In records containing phone, address, location, IP, device, work profile, billing, contract, or platform ID, users should check account recovery options, session history, forwarding rules, and suspicious messages. In corporate accounts, this information should be shared with the security team.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Separate email, unique password, and limiting profile visibility in sensitive social memberships reduce long-term risk. In the long term, password manager, unique password, multi-factor authentication, closing old accounts, and deleting unnecessary profile fields are the basic defense. Since permanent personal data cannot be recovered, account behavior and verification processes should be strengthened.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of institutions, these events show that data minimization, third-party access, retention period of customer records, employee documents, and incident notification processes need to be regularly audited. On the user side, not repeating the same identity information across different services reduces persistent risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should check if the same email-password is used on dating and social network accounts if it matches this record. If a match is seen, the user should first read which data fields are listed, and then prioritize the steps accordingly. If there is a password, password change should be prioritized; if there is an address or phone, a fraud alert; if there is an IP or device, session control; if there is a sensitive membership, privacy control should be prioritized.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Final assessment: Although this record has not been verified, it has been classified as sensitive due to the context of acquaintance and the password field. The user should compare this record with their own account history; they should individually check the services where they have used the same email, phone, username, IP, address, or password. Suspicious search, email, message, or account recovery notifications should be considered higher risk after the incident.\u003C\u002Fp>","PassionsNetwork Alleged Data Exposure (825.8 Thousand Email Identifiers)","PassionsNetwork Alleged Data Exposure. 825.8 Thousand email identifiers are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Passwords, Usernames. Review the scope…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fpassionsnetwork_official.png",false,{"name":38,"sector":39,"country":40,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":16,"websiteStatus":16,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"PassionsNetwork","Dating \u002F Social Network","United States"]