[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3nozub8u9ijmi":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":15,"sourceUrls":16,"pwnCount":17,"affectedCount":17,"affectedCountStatus":18,"affectedCountLowerBound":19,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":21,"dataClasses":22,"description":25,"seoTitle":26,"seoTitleEn":27,"seoDescription":26,"seoDescriptionEn":28,"logoUrl":29,"isVerified":30,"isSensitive":30,"isSpamList":30,"isMalware":30,"company":31},"68e3266eda11adda4882530b","Pemiblanc","Pemiblanc Alleged Data Exposure","pemiblanc","pemiblanc.com","2018-04-02T00:00:00.000Z","2018-07-09T22:16:26.000Z","2026-07-18T23:55:54.554Z","Unverified breach record","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.troyhunt.com\u002Fthe-111-million-pemiblanc-credential-stuffing-list\u002F",[15],110964206,"known",null,"email_identifiers","Critical",[23,24],"Email addresses","Passwords","\u003Cp>Pemiblanc is a large credential list that emerged in April 2018 and contains approximately 111 million email address and password pairs. The list has not been verified as direct customer data taken from a single company's system; it should be considered a credential stuffing list compiled from credentials from different breaches that feed account takeover attempts. Therefore, the Pemiblanc incident is a large-scale account security issue demonstrating how password reuse creates cascading risks for users rather than a classic company data breach.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The verifiable scope is limited to 110,964,206 affected accounts, email addresses, and passwords. The list was found on a French server, it was indicated that the content is compiled from various data breaches, and it was emphasized that the source cannot be reduced to a single service. The Pemiblanc record should be kept in the unverified class; because although the list contains real personal data, the authenticity of all entries cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The main fields in the Pemiblanc dataset are email addresses and passwords. An email address alone can be used for spam, phishing, fake login alerts, and account reset messages. The password field, however, poses the most critical risk; if the same password is used across multiple services, attackers can try to take over accounts on different sites through automated login attempts. For this reason, the list is not just a leak of contact information, but a compilation of credentials that directly carry the risk of account access.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The data classes do not include payment cards, official identification, private messages, health information, physical addresses, or financial account details. Risk assessment should be based on email and password pairs. Since most users cannot clearly know which service the passwords come from, all important accounts where the same or similar password is used fall into the risk area.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The incident date for Pemiblanc should be considered as April 2, 2018, the record addition date as July 9, 2018, and the number of affected accounts as 110,964,206. Although the domain is registered as pemiblanc.com, the incident should not be described as a single violation taken from a brand's customer database. The available evidence shows that the list consists of email and password pairs from various breaches and is of a compiled nature that could be used for account takeover attacks.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Records in the unverified category should fail. This classification does not mean that there is no real personal data in the list; it only requires a more cautious approach because the origin and accuracy of all rows cannot be definitively proven. Therefore, the text focuses on the security measures that the user should take, without asserting a definite source or assigning responsibility to a single company.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The highest risk is seen in people who reuse the same email and password across multiple sites. If the same password has been used on old forum, gaming, shopping, social media, or email accounts, this list gives attackers an advantage for quick attempts. Employees who register for personal services with their corporate email address are also at risk; because reused passwords increase the likelihood of attacks on work accounts, cloud services, or internal portals.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Passwords that have not been changed for a long time, family accounts used jointly, login information created with easily remembered words without a password manager, and accounts with two-factor authentication turned off are more sensitive. Even if the list is outdated, the risk is not considered over; because reused passwords can be tried on different services even years later.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Users who are found to have Pemiblanc matches should first identify all accounts that use the same password and choose a unique, strong password for each. Priority should be given especially to email accounts, banking and payment services, social media, shopping sites, cloud storage, and work accounts. Password changes should be considered not only for the service associated with Pemiblanc but for all accounts where the same password is repeated.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Two-step verification should be enabled wherever possible, recent sessions and connected devices should be reviewed, and unrecognized sessions should be closed. The recovery address and phone number for the email account should be checked, and unexpected password reset messages should be paid attention to. Using a password manager makes it easier to store unique and long passwords for each service.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>In the long term, the basic defense is to completely stop reusing passwords and to use additional verification for important accounts. When a unique password is chosen for each account, the impact of credential stuffing lists is greatly reduced; an old leak from one service cannot be transferred to other accounts. Users should especially regard their email account as the main security hub, keep its password unique, and make additional verification mandatory.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>An additional measure for organizations is to monitor employee emails for appearances in known credential lists, use policies that reduce password reuse, and examine session behaviors for high-risk accounts. Since old password lists have not completely disappeared, past breaches should be considered not only as historical data but also as a signal for current account security.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>LeakData check shows whether the queried email address is found in the Pemiblanc dataset. A positive result indicates that the email address appears in a credential stuffing list along with a password; however, it does not by itself prove which service the password came from or the exact origin of each line in the list. Due to this limitation, user action should be cautious but quick.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>A negative result only means that no match was found in this data set; it does not eliminate the possibility of appearing in other breaches. Users who receive a positive result should prioritize changing passwords on all accounts where they use the same password, enabling two-factor authentication, session monitoring, and using a password manager. The most accurate approach is to retire all old and reused passwords and use unique login information for each account.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Pemiblanc Alleged Data Exposure (111 Million Email Identifiers)","Pemiblanc Alleged Data Exposure. 111 Million email identifiers were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fpemiblanc_com.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":32,"country":26,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":26,"websiteStatus":26,"websiteCheckedAt":19},"Credential stuffing list"]