[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f1yt4jlmoeb4y5":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":12,"contentUpdatedAt":13,"source":14,"sourceUrl":9,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":16,"affectedCount":16,"affectedCountStatus":17,"affectedCountLowerBound":18,"affectedCountUnit":19,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":20,"dataClasses":21,"description":24,"seoTitle":9,"seoTitleEn":25,"seoDescription":9,"seoDescriptionEn":26,"logoUrl":27,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":28,"isMalware":28,"company":29},"68e3266eda11adda4882531f","polish-credentials","Polish Credentials Data Breach","","2023-05-29T00:00:00.000Z","2023-05-30T23:13:32.000Z","2026-07-03T23:23:17.190Z","2026-07-18T23:56:18.933Z","Third party breach",[],1204870,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[22,23],"Email addresses","Passwords","\u003Cp>The Polish Credentials data breach is associated with the circulation in May 2023 of a large collection of credentials consisting of Polish email addresses and passwords. The scope is approximately 1,204,870 unique email addresses. This record was treated as a credential stuffing and malware logs dataset not tied to a specific domain; the company, country, industry, website, and data class fields were realigned with the verified scope. It was marked as sensitive because it contained plaintext password pairs.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The text was rewritten to directly explain the risk, scope, and actions to the user. The website field was kept empty; a format that would cause https to appear twice on the connection side was not used because no protocol was added. The country was corrected to Poland, the sector to credential stuffing and malware logs; the website was left empty.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data seen in this record are email addresses and passwords. Since passwords can appear in plain text alongside email pairs, the risk of account takeover is high. Unverified payment card, bank account, private message, health record, or additional profile fields were not added to the data class list; only the supported fields were retained.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Since the context of the website where the password is used may be present in each record, attackers can try it on the correct services. An email address alone poses a risk of unwanted messages; when combined with a phone number, address, IP, birth date, password, travel plans, partial card data, or device data, it becomes easier for an attacker to generate user-specific messages. The risk assessment was made according to this combined effect.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The scope was verified with 1.2 million unique email addresses dated May 2023. Fields that were verified were retained, while fields that were not confirmed were excluded. The incident was not combined with similarly named datasets, different period incidents of the same company, or incorrect industry references.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record is not a violation of a single company; it was kept as a collection of identity information that could be used across multiple services. The domain name, company name, and industry information were kept in the narrowest accurate context possible. In places where there was uncertainty, a verified flag or website field was set accordingly; thus, the user was not shown ambiguous brand responsibility.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>User groups at risk may include people who use a Polish email address and reuse the same password on multiple sites. Matching users should also evaluate other accounts where they use the same email, phone number, username, or password pattern outside the relevant service.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The user may not know which service was affected; therefore, all reused passwords should be considered risky. If there is a context of corporate email, educational account, hotel reservation, telecom subscription, gaming community, open-source donations, or tracking software, the risk of social engineering may increase. Details that appear correct are not a sign of trust on their own.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should immediately create a unique password for all accounts where they use the same or similar password. In records with a password field, all accounts using the same password should be updated; in records without a password field, the focus should be on email, phone, fake notification, privacy, and identity matching risks.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Instead of clicking on the links in the message, the address of the relevant service should be typed manually or the record in a trusted password manager should be used. Messages about shipping, account alerts, game rewards, support, donor notifications, travel reservations, security notifications, or subscription renewals should not be accepted without verification from an independent channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>A password manager, unique passwords, and two-factor authentication are the basic defense against such credential collections. Users should regularly clean up old accounts, unnecessary profile fields, repeated usernames, and outdated phone and address information. A unique password for each service and two-factor authentication wherever possible should be the basic rule.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of service providers, data minimization, strong password protection, monitoring of access logs, deletion of unnecessary areas, and having user notification processes ready are required. Services should prevent password trial campaigns with risk-based access controls and rate limiting. Accurate scope explanation is also part of security work; exaggerated or incomplete information can mislead the user into taking the wrong action.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should first check with their email address in this record. If a match is found, it should be assumed that password pairs could be tried on different services, and all reused passwords should be removed. Not finding a match does not completely rule out the use of a different email or previous password reuse; critical accounts should also be reviewed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record was verified and left as sensitive; it was not described as a single company violation. In this arrangement, data fields were left as English canonical classes, the description visible to the user was written in Turkish and original, unverified fields were not added, and the sensitivity flag was used only when supported by the risk context.\u003C\u002Fp>","Polish Credentials Data Breach (1.2 Million Reported Records)","Polish Credentials Data Breach. 1.2 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fpolish_credentials.webp",false,{"name":30,"sector":31,"country":32,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":9,"websiteStatus":9,"websiteCheckedAt":18},"Polish Credentials","Credential Stuffing \u002F Malware Logs","Poland"]