[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f88qiikq2wfbh":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":21,"availableLocales":22,"translations":24,"severity":27,"dataClasses":28,"description":33,"seoTitle":34,"seoDescription":35,"logoUrl":36,"isVerified":37,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":37,"isMalware":37,"company":38},"6a4568a189fed8218dce5f48","regme","RegMe Alleged Data Exposure","regme.online","2022-08-01T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-01T19:21:04.175Z",null,"2026-09-19T17:08:19.658Z","2026-09-17T17:03:50.240Z","Third party breach","https:\u002F\u002Fregme.online\u002F",[16],269940,"known","email_identifiers","en",[21,23],"tr",{"en":25,"tr":26},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"High",[29,30,31,32],"Email addresses","Names","Passwords","Phone numbers","\u003Cp>The RegMe data leak is a dataset covering approximately 269,940 user records, reportedly belonging to the RegMe service associated with event and meeting participation management, and dated to the August 2022 period. The listed fields consist of email addresses, name information, phone numbers, and password hashes. Verification is limited due to the absence of an official notification or an independent institution statement; nevertheless, the simultaneous presence of phone, email, and password fields creates a significant account security and social engineering risk for users. The event participation context may help attackers make their messages more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Listing fields such as email address, full name, phone number, and password hash together in a RegMe registration increases the risk of multi-channel attacks. The email address can be used for phishing, the phone number for fraud via SMS or calls, and the name information can be used to personalize messages. The password hash is not a plain text password; however, if a weak password or an outdated hash method is used, cracking attempts can occur. Due to the context of the event platform, messages such as fake invitations, registration confirmations, ticket renewals, meeting links, or payment confirmations may appear more trustworthy.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>This record appears in open data lists with similar sizes and fields; however, since there is no verifiable event notification published by the company, the verification flag on LeakData has been left off. The scope refers to the approximate number of rows and should not be interpreted as the number of unique individuals. Not all fields may be present in each row. Activity contents, payment information, identity documents, or private messages have not been added as verified fields for this record. The user's security action should be determined based on the practical risk posed by the email, phone, and password combination, even though it is a data set with limited certainty.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Users at risk may be those who have registered for an event via RegMe, shared their phone number and email for attending a meeting or conference. Those attending corporate events, using a company email address, and repeating the same password across different work tools carry higher risk. Attackers may send links under the pretense of upcoming events, changed meeting links, refunds, participation certificates, or registration verification. Users with a phone number may also be exposed to scenarios such as requesting a one-time code via SMS or fake support calls. Therefore, work and personal accounts should be evaluated together.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Users whose accounts have a match should check whether the password they might have used on their RegMe account is also used on other services. If the same password or similar variants are found in work email, calendar, video conferencing, CRM, social media, or personal email accounts, it should be changed and multi-factor authentication should be enabled. Event links received via phone or SMS should not be opened directly; they should be verified through the official channel of the event organizer. Unexpected links and file attachments in calendar invitations should be carefully examined. Corporate users should report email address matches to their information security teams.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Event platforms should not store unnecessary phone and password data for a long time, should use modern password hashing, and should regularly reduce old event records. Users should protect their work and personal event accounts with different passwords, and if possible, should prefer a separate email address for event records. Organizations should raise awareness so that the passwords employees use on event platforms are not the same as their work accounts. Short links and unexpected file attachments in event messages should be considered risky. In the long term, the best defense is to end password reuse and verify requests coming through the phone via an independent channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>LeakData checking helps you see whether your email address matches the RegMe record. If there is a match, first change accounts where you use the same password, and enable additional verification on your email and work accounts. Considering that your phone number may also have been included, carefully review SMS links, fake activity notifications, and meeting invites. Not finding a match may exclude older records made with a different email address. Even if this record is not confirmed with an official notification, it should be monitored from a social engineering perspective due to the context of activity and phone usage.\u003C\u002Fp>","RegMe Alleged Data Exposure (269.9 Thousand Email Identifiers)","RegMe Alleged Data Exposure. 269.9 Thousand email identifiers are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fregme.webp",false,{"name":39,"sector":40,"country":41,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":42,"websiteStatus":42,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"RegMe","Events \u002F Registration Platform","Russia",""]