[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f112ellze9an19":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":19,"affectedCount":19,"affectedCountStatus":20,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":22,"availableLocales":23,"translations":25,"severity":28,"dataClasses":29,"description":36,"seoTitle":37,"seoDescription":38,"logoUrl":39,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":40,"isSpamList":40,"isMalware":40,"company":41},"6a45b23fd9d12b1e82ce5f4b","stadgenoot","Stadgenoot Data Breach","stadgenoot.nl","2021-02-01T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-02T00:35:11.598Z",null,"2026-09-17T16:27:41.515Z","2026-07-19T00:07:32.146Z","Third party breach","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.computable.nl\u002F2021\u002F02\u002F16\u002Fstadgenoot-getroffen-door-datalek\u002F",[16,18],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.privacy-web.nl\u002Fnieuws\u002Fwachtwoorden-en-geboortedata-van-duizenden-woningzoekenden-op-straat-door-datalek-bij-stadgenoot",33250,"known","unknown","en",[22,24],"tr",{"en":26,"tr":27},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"Medium",[30,31,32,33,34,35],"Email addresses","Names","Genders","Dates of birth","Phone numbers","Passwords","\u003Cp>The Stadgenoot data breach is a security incident examined within the housing and property management organization associated with the domain www.stadgenoot.nl and dated to February 2021. This record was added because it is supported as a single incident affecting 33,250 accounts in records seen in open breach inventories. The record only retained fields for email addresses, first and last names, gender information, dates of birth, phone numbers, and password hashes; unsupported or seemingly contradictory data types were left out to avoid misleading the user.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Before the stadium mate registration was opened, the matches in the existing records regarding the title, domain name, similar brand name, event date, and number of registrations were checked. Since no record representing the same event was found, it was kept as a separate record. Records with similar names but different domains or different events were excluded from this decision.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Differences may be observed between the number of records in the target lists and the number of details that can be verified. This may be due to differences in raw rows, unique accounts, duplicate emails, cleaned records, forum rows, profile rows, or repackaged data sets. On this page, the value of 33,250, which is consistently supported along with the data types, has been taken as the basis, not the highest number seen.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Stadgenoot is an organization evaluated in the context of housing and property management based in Amsterdam. When housing accounts include personal fields such as full name, date of birth, and phone number, the risk of social engineering increases.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>In this incident, email, name, gender, date of birth, phone, and password hashes were compromised. Although additional sensitive fields were mentioned in the public disclosure, fields not directly listed in the data type list were not included in this record.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In the Stadgenoot incident, the risk is higher than an ordinary email leak because a hashed password information was found. The password data reduces attackers' trial-and-error time, facilitates automatic login attempts on other services where the same password is used, and makes password reset messages more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Although an email address alone may seem like a limited personal data, when combined with a username, IP address, phone number, full name, date of birth, or password information, it turns into a strong attack vector. If the user uses the same email address for work, shopping, forums, games, health, finance, or social media accounts, the impact can extend beyond the relevant platform.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Even if this incident is from the past, its security value continues. A significant portion of users reuse old password patterns with minor changes. Therefore, an old breach like Stadgenoot can be used in password guessing, credential stuffing, and targeted phishing attempts even years later.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The users' first step is to remember which email address and password they might have used in the past on Stadgenoot or www.stadgenoot.nl. If the same password family has been used on other accounts, it is not enough to make a change only on the relevant site; all reused passwords must be replaced with unique and random passwords.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Using a password manager is one of the most effective measures that can be taken after this incident. Creating a separate password for each site prevents a single breach from spreading to other accounts in a chain. Old passwords saved in the browser should also be reviewed, and weak or repeated passwords should be cleaned up.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Two-factor authentication is especially a priority for email accounts, password managers, financial accounts, social media profiles, job search accounts, and admin panels. App-based authentication or a hardware security key provides more resilient protection compared to SMS-based authentication.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Forwarding rules, recovery addresses, connected applications, trusted device list, and recent sessions in the email account should be checked. Even if the attacker cannot directly access the Stadgenoot account, they can target password reset flows of other services through the email account.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In phishing risk, the old service name, username, industry information, country, hobby, or registration date can be used. Users should type the address themselves instead of clicking on incoming links directly, should not open file attachments without verifying them, and should be cautious against messages that create a sense of urgency.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Risk should also be assessed for corporate users. If an employee used their work email on an account that appears to be personal, it is possible to try the same password on company systems. Domain-based security scans, multi-factor authentication, and controls that catch password reuse are therefore important.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>From the perspective of site owners, the main lesson is password storage and data minimization. Plain text or quickly crackable hash formats directly weaken user security. In modern systems, strong, salted, and slow password derivation methods should be used, and old hash formats should be gradually updated during user login.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Backups, test environments, export files, old forum software, admin panels, and unnecessary privileges should be regularly audited. Many data leaks originate not from the visible part of the main application, but from forgotten auxiliary systems or accounts with extensive privileges.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In institutions without an incident response plan, user notification, password reset, log review, and connected system checks are delayed. Which systems will be monitored, which records will be kept, which users will be informed, and which backups will be reviewed should be predefined.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The value of 33,250 was used because the number directly supported by the Stadgenoot target line is almost the same.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Due to the housing context, fake rent, application, payment, document update, or appointment messages may be more convincing. Users should verify through the official channel.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Since birth date and phone number can be used in account recovery flows, users should pay special attention to email security.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The record was not marked as retired because the site returned 200 in the latest check.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The logo image was matched with the record for Stadgenoot.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>In this record, unverified data types were specifically left out. Rather than creating a longer list of data classes, clearly showing the supported fields is more valuable for user confidence. On data breach pages, the aim is not to look intimidating, but to clearly explain the correct scope and applicable security measures.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>This page was prepared to provide straightforward, Turkish, and applicable information on different terms such as Stadgenoot data breach, www.stadgenoot.nl data leak, Stadgenoot password leak, and Stadgenoot user data. The text explains the verified areas and practical security steps.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>When users see this record, they should evaluate not only the account on the relevant platform but also other accounts they have opened with the same email address. Accounts where old passwords are reused are particularly the first target for attackers. Closing old accounts also provides long-term risk reduction.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>To reduce password reuse, new passwords should not include brand names, birth years, usernames, team names, hobbies, cities, or easily guessed additions. Adding a small number or special character to the end of a password does not make it secure; attacker tools try these patterns quickly.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The account security checklist is clear: change the old password, update all accounts using the same password, enable two-factor authentication, check email recovery information, close unknown sessions, and use the direct site address instead of links in suspicious messages.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Security teams should evaluate this record in terms of email addresses that match employee domain names. Corporate email addresses used in old forum, shopping, financial, or community accounts can enrich attackers' target lists.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Data minimization is critical in such incidents. Unnecessary profile fields should not be collected, inactive accounts should be cleared with reasonable retention policies, access to sensitive fields should be restricted, and data export operations should be additionally monitored.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Instead of panicking, users need to complete account hygiene. Closing old and forgotten accounts, deleting unnecessary memberships, updating recovery addresses, and enabling login notifications on important accounts provide permanent protection.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The risk level on this page was determined as critical, taking into account the number of affected accounts, the type of password information, the potential of data classes for account takeover, and whether the incident involved reusable credentials. The critical level does not indicate definite misuse, but signifies that the user needs to take rapid action.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>As a result for Stadgenoot, this record is a single data breach entry from the February 2021 period affecting 33,250 accounts and includes fields such as email addresses, names and surnames, gender information, dates of birth, phone numbers, and password hashes. Users are advised to use unique passwords, enable two-factor authentication, check email security settings, and monitor suspicious login alerts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Since in the Stadgenoot record the numerical value, title, and domain are evaluated together, ambiguous list items circulating under the same name were not transferred to this page. The record seen by the user is limited to the verified domain and the event period.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Keeping data classes simple is especially important; because adding unsupported fields disrupts the user's risk assessment. Therefore, claims other than email addresses, full name information, gender information, dates of birth, phone numbers, and password hashes are not presented as proven data fields for this record.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Old memberships related to the domain www.stadgenoot.nl may have been forgotten. If password changes cannot be made for forgotten accounts, it is a more realistic priority to find other services where the same password was used and secure them.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>When a username, email, or phone information is combined with other leaks, it becomes easier for attackers to guess a person's interests, country, sector, or past membership habits. Therefore, even if a single breach seems small, the combined risk is greater.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>From the perspective of institutions, the use of work email in employees' personal memberships should be addressed in regular awareness trainings. Such records provide a warning signal to measure password reuse and the visibility of corporate identities on personal platforms.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If the user sees their own email in this record, they should start with the most important accounts first: email inbox, bank or investment account, password manager, cloud storage, social media, and frequently used shopping accounts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>If account closure is possible, closing unnecessary old memberships is also a good step. For accounts that cannot be closed, at least the password should be made unique, profile information should be minimized, and login notifications should be enabled.\u003C\u002Fp>","Stadgenoot Data Breach (33.3 Thousand Reported Records)","Stadgenoot Data Breach. 33.3 Thousand reported records are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Genders. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fstadgenoot.jpg",false,{"name":42,"sector":43,"country":44,"website":45,"websiteArchiveUrl":46,"websiteStatus":46,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"Stadgenoot","Housing \u002F Property Management","Netherlands","www.stadgenoot.nl",""]