[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f2jtr8vcgecfhg":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":11,"contentUpdatedAt":12,"source":13,"sourceUrl":14,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":16,"affectedCount":16,"affectedCountStatus":17,"affectedCountLowerBound":18,"affectedCountUnit":19,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":20,"dataClasses":21,"description":29,"seoTitle":14,"seoTitleEn":30,"seoDescription":14,"seoDescriptionEn":31,"logoUrl":32,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":33,"isMalware":33,"company":34},"68e3266eda11adda488253a7","tangerine","Tangerine Data Breach","tangerinetelecom.com.au","2024-02-18T00:00:00.000Z","2024-02-28T01:42:43.000Z","2026-07-18T23:59:00.438Z","Third party breach","",[],243462,"known",null,"unknown","High",[22,23,24,25,26,27,28],"Dates of birth","Email addresses","Names","Passwords","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Salutations","\u003Cp>The Tangerine data breach is a security incident recorded in February 2024 that affected approximately 243,000 accounts. In the incident related to the Australia-based telecom provider, the contact, address, date of birth, and password fields in the former customer database were exposed. This content has been prepared so that users can understand the scope of the incident, the exposed fields, the risk level, and the steps they need to take on a single page.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The combination of phone, address, and date of birth information with the password field for telecom customers creates a critical risk in terms of identity verification and account security. The statement only includes verifiable data categories; different services with the same name, additional claims whose technical details are unclear, or unproven information are not presented as part of the data field. This approach makes the real risk visible without misleading the user.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data listed in this incident are: dates of birth, email addresses, names, passwords, phone numbers, physical addresses, and salutation information. Phone and address information are persistent personal fields that can be used in telecom account verification processes. When these fields are used together, they can result in account takeover, social engineering, fraud, physical targeting, or privacy violations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>It is understood that the traditional password field used in the past contains the bcrypt hash value; if the same password was used on other accounts, it should be changed. The use of the same or similar passwords on other services in records containing passwords is one of the most critical risks. In records without passwords, fields such as device, location, phone, address, education, job application, or financial context can make targeted messages more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The record covers approximately 243,000 customer records associated with the domain tangerinetelecom.com.au. The incident is classified as a confirmed record. In the scope assessment, the number of accounts, domain name, sector, country, and data classes were checked separately. The data fields shown to the user were limited to the fields actually listed in the record.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The sector has been corrected to Australia telecommunications and internet service provision, not other. This boundary is particularly important for similar brand names, registrations covering multiple services, or sensitive sectors. The registration has not been merged with another event, has not been extended in a way that would create duplicate records, and the company context has been clarified as much as possible.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Tangerine customers who use the same phone and email combination for banking or public accounts are at risk. The primary risk for these individuals is that the leaked data can be matched with common information used in other accounts. When the same email address, phone number, username, device ID, or password is repeated, attackers may try these details on different services.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The telecom context can be exploited with fake line verification, billing, modem, SIM changes, or identity verification messages. For corporate users, work email and job information stand out, while for individual users, address, birth date, purchases, location, or membership context is prominent. In fields such as education, telecom, finance, travel, politics, job applications, and VPNs, the context itself can also increase the targeting risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should check their telecom account security settings, email sessions, and verification requests received via phone. If a password or password-like field is listed, users should change it on all accounts where they use the same password, use a unique password, and enable multi-factor authentication where possible. Taking action on only one platform may not be sufficient.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If there are fields such as phone, address, date of birth, device ID, official ID, job application, or reward balance, users should check account recovery information, registered sessions, email forwarding, and suspicious messages. For institutions, processes should be updated against employee alerts, fake invoices, and account verification attempts.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Strong customer PIN codes, multi-factor authentication, and SIM change alerts on telecom accounts provide long-term protection. In the long term, password manager, unique passwords, multi-factor authentication, closing old accounts, deleting unnecessary profile fields, and data minimization form the basic security line. Since permanent personal data cannot be recovered, defense relies on strengthening account behavior.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On the company and institutional side, post-incident inventory, access permissions, storage of old data, notification processes, and the use of third-party platforms should be reconsidered. On the user side, avoiding the repetition of the same identity information across different services and the habit of verifying suspicious communications through a second channel provide lasting protection.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The user should be careful about fake verification requests that may come through the phone line and email account if there is a match with this record. If a match is seen, the user should first read which data fields are listed, and then prioritize the steps according to these fields. If there is a password, password change should be prioritized; if there is an official ID, ID monitoring; if there is location or device information, device security; if there is an education or job application, account verification at the institution should be prioritized.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Final assessment: This record is a sensitive telecom data incident because it combines date of birth, address, phone number, and password fields. The user should compare this record with their own account history; they should individually check the services where they use the same email, phone number, username, or password. Unexpected calls, messages, emails, or account recovery notifications should be considered higher risk after the incident.\u003C\u002Fp>","Tangerine Data Breach (243.5 Thousand Reported Records)","Tangerine Data Breach. 243.5 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Dates of birth, Email addresses, Names. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Ftangerinetelecom_com_au.webp",false,{"name":35,"sector":36,"country":37,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":14,"websiteStatus":14,"websiteCheckedAt":18},"Tangerine","Telecommunications \u002F ISP","Australia"]