[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3minltq4s49sz":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":21,"availableLocales":22,"translations":24,"severity":27,"dataClasses":28,"description":34,"seoTitle":35,"seoDescription":36,"logoUrl":37,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":38,"isMalware":38,"company":39},"6a452308a20f867c8ba8e70b","tisza-vilg","TISZA Világ Data Breach","tiszavilag.hu","2025-10-06T00:00:00.000Z","2025-11-08T09:45:55.000Z",null,"2026-07-07T10:14:39.761Z","2026-07-19T00:02:24.243Z","Third party breach","",[],198520,"known","unknown","en",[21,23],"tr",{"en":25,"tr":26},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"High",[29,30,31,32,33],"Email addresses","Names","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Usernames","\u003Cp>The TISZA World breach was recorded in October 2025 with the exposure of personal data from services associated with the TISZA political movement in Hungary. The dataset contained approximately 199,000 unique email addresses; it included names, phone numbers, physical addresses, and usernames. Due to the political context, this record should be considered more sensitive than an ordinary communication data leak.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The types of data listed in this record are the fields Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses, and Usernames. Password or payment card fields are not listed. Nevertheless, communication data associated with the context of a political party or movement may allow inferences about users' political views, support relationships, or community connections.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>In data breaches in the political context, the main risk is not account takeover but targeted social pressure, harassment, disinformation, and fake campaign messages. When a user's name, phone number, address, and email address are included in the same record, personalized political communication, donation requests, event invitations, or threat messages can be prepared.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Phone and physical address fields extend the risk beyond email. The user can be reached via SMS, call, or mail. Fake campaign notifications, donation requests, volunteer registration, petition campaigns, event announcements, or voter information update messages should be carefully checked. Having accurate personal information does not prove that the message is trustworthy.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The usernames field may match identities on social media or campaign platforms. If the same username is used on different political, social, or community accounts, the TISZA Világ record can be linked to a broader digital profile. Affected individuals should not unnecessarily leave address, phone number, and personal opinions exposed on public profiles.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record should be considered sensitive because the political context may have consequences for some users in terms of personal safety, work relationships, or social environment. Each record does not prove an individual's active political role; however, being included in the dataset alone may increase the risk of being targeted in certain settings. Therefore, the text should focus on the security risk without using labeling or accusatory language toward individuals.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>From the perspective of institutions, the TISZA World event demonstrates that communication data on political and community platforms requires special protection. Campaign, volunteer, and supporter data are not just a marketing list; they may contain sensitive inferences about political views. Access permissions, data retention periods, and user notifications should be managed with this sensitivity.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Affected individuals should verify donations, events, volunteering, address verification, voter information, or account verification messages coming in the context of TISZA World or political campaigns through an independent channel. In particular, messages that involve threats, pressure, or require urgent action should not be responded to; if there is a personal safety risk, appropriate support channels should be contacted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Due to political sensitivity in the TISZA World record, users need to consider not only technical security but also physical and social security. Users with address and phone information can be targeted not only by email but also by calls, SMS, or mail. In communications involving harassment, misleading campaign messages, or pressure, users should preserve evidence and contact reliable support channels.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>When interpreting such records, language that labels individuals should not be used. Being in the dataset does not prove that a person is actively engaged in political activities or has participated in a specific action. The most accurate approach is to protect the individual's privacy and focus on reducing social engineering risks.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>For institutions, data minimization in political community data is critically important. When address and phone fields that are not necessary for campaign or volunteer communication are stored longer than needed, the impact of a breach increases. Users should be clearly informed about which data is kept, why it is kept, and how it can be deleted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Affected individuals should approach politically themed links and donation requests with caution.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Due to this sensitive context, the record should be considered a long-term privacy risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Every verification request should be checked through official and known channels.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If this record matches your email address, check your accounts by considering the listed data types one by one. Even if the incident is old, email, password, phone, address, or identity context can be combined with other data sets and later used in targeted fraud.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The priority is to change accounts that use the same password, enable two-step verification on critical accounts, log out of unexpected sessions, and use the known login page instead of links to avoid fake notifications. Even if there is no password in the record, the email and profile fields may be sufficient for phishing.\u003C\u002Fp>","TISZA Világ Data Breach (198.5 Thousand Reported Records)","TISZA Világ Data Breach. 198.5 Thousand reported records are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Phone numbers. Review the scope, risks, and…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Ftiszavilag_hu.webp",false,{"name":40,"sector":41,"country":42,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":16,"websiteStatus":16,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"TISZA Világ","Political Organization","Hungary"]