[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fmv4hvleq16el":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"publishedAt":12,"modifiedDate":13,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":12,"affectedCountUnit":20,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":21,"availableLocales":22,"translations":24,"severity":27,"dataClasses":28,"description":38,"seoTitle":39,"seoDescription":40,"logoUrl":41,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":42,"isMalware":42,"company":43},"6a45390cda47bd0e94ce5f47","tracelo","Tracelo Data Breach","tracelo.com","2024-09-01T00:00:00.000Z","2024-10-02T04:20:56.000Z",null,"2026-07-04T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-19T00:03:44.862Z","Third party breach","",[],812055,"known","unknown","en",[21,23],"tr",{"en":25,"tr":26},{"slug":7},{"slug":7},"High",[29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"Email addresses","Names","Passwords","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Phone carriers","Geographic locations","Subscription details","Google IDs","\u003Cp>The Tracelo data breach record is a security incident that came to light in the September 2024 period and is associated with approximately 812,000 records. In the incident related to mobile location and people search services, account, phone, location, operator, and subscription fields were exposed. This statement has been prepared to clarify which data fields of the user may be at risk, the boundaries for verifying the incident, and the actionable security steps.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The combination of location, phone operator, subscription, and account fields makes this record more sensitive than ordinary membership data. Only data classes compatible with the available record are used in the text; unverified technical details, different events, or similarly named services are not presented as definite information under this record. This way, the user can see real risks without exaggeration but without leaving out anything.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The types of data listed in this record are: email addresses, names, passwords, phone numbers, physical addresses, phone carriers, geographic locations, subscription information, and Google IDs. The location, phone, and carrier fields can provide strong signals about a person's physical and communication profile. When used together, these fields can make fake notifications, account recovery, targeted calls, identity linking, or fraud attempts more convincing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Since the password field is present, using the same password on other accounts directly creates a risk of account takeover. Even in records without a password, fields such as phone, address, IP, device information, work profile, membership, or physical location can pose a significant risk on their own. If there is a password or password-like field, it should also be checked whether the same information is repeated across different services.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The record covers user data associated with the domain tracelo.com; although some reports give a higher total record volume, this page is limited to approximately 812,000 unique accounts. The incident has been retained in the verified record class supported by security news. The scope has been written by separately evaluating the domain name, sector, country, account number, data classes, and the likelihood of overlap with similar incidents. Data types not listed have not been shown as if they were possessed by the user.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Higher total registration numbers in the news have not been directly shown to the user as the number of unique accounts. In records with a verification limit, the text is not presented as a definitive company statement. In records that may be duplicates or resemble a sub-event of another brand, this distinction is indirectly shown to the user and data fields are not unnecessarily expanded.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Tracelo users, people whose phone and location information has been exposed, and accounts with a subscription area are at risk. The primary risk for these individuals is that the leaked data could be matched with information used in other accounts. If the same email, phone number, username, IP, address, social profile, or password is repeated across different accounts, the attack surface increases.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The context of location and person search can be used in fake security alerts, subscription, device verification, or phone account messages. Media, real estate, telecommunications, logistics, gaming, video, Discord services, dating platforms, and professional data contexts create different risks. The user should consider not only the data fields but also which service context these fields are associated with.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Affected users should change their passwords and check for suspicious sessions on their phone and email accounts. If a password or password-like field is listed, users should make changes on all accounts where they use the same or similar password, use a unique password, and enable multi-factor authentication wherever possible. The email account should also be checked.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In records containing phone, address, location, IP, device, work profile, billing, contract, or platform ID, users should check account recovery options, session history, forwarding rules, and suspicious messages. In corporate accounts, this information should be shared with the security team.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>In location-based services, unnecessary profile and subscription information should be reduced, and sensitive application permissions should be regularly audited. In the long term, a password manager, unique passwords, multi-factor authentication, the closure of old accounts, and the deletion of unnecessary profile fields are the basic defenses. Since permanent personal data cannot be recovered, account behavior and verification processes should be strengthened.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>From the perspective of institutions, these events show that data minimization, third-party access, retention period of customer records, employee documents, and incident notification processes need to be regularly audited. On the user side, not repeating the same identity information across different services reduces persistent risk.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If the user matches with this record, they should check phone, email, and location-based service accounts together. If a match is seen, the user should first read which data fields are listed, then prioritize the steps accordingly. If there is a password, password change should be prioritized; if there is an address or phone, a fraud alert; if there is an IP or device, session control; if there is sensitive membership, privacy check should be prioritized.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Final assessment: This record is a high-sensitivity mobile data event because it combines password, location, phone, address, and subscription fields. The user should compare this record with their account history; they should separately check the services where they use the same email, phone, username, IP, address, or password. Suspicious calls, emails, messages, or account recovery notifications should be considered higher risk after the event.\u003C\u002Fp>","Tracelo Data Breach (812.1 Thousand Reported Records)","Tracelo Data Breach. 812.1 Thousand reported records are reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Ftracelo_com.png",false,{"name":44,"sector":45,"country":46,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":16,"websiteStatus":16,"websiteCheckedAt":12},"Tracelo","Mobile Geolocation \u002F People Search","United States"]