[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fs3u79n9rxd6h":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":7,"domain":9,"breachDate":10,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":11,"contentUpdatedAt":12,"source":13,"sourceUrl":14,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":18,"affectedCount":18,"affectedCountStatus":19,"affectedCountLowerBound":20,"affectedCountUnit":21,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":22,"dataClasses":23,"description":27,"seoTitle":28,"seoTitleEn":29,"seoDescription":28,"seoDescriptionEn":30,"logoUrl":31,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":32,"isSpamList":32,"isMalware":32,"company":33},"68e3266eda11adda488253d0","trello","Trello Data Breach","trello.com","2024-01-16T00:00:00.000Z","2024-01-22T19:41:05.000Z","2026-07-20T03:36:53.505Z","API breach","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com\u002Fnews\u002Fsecurity\u002Ftrello-api-abused-to-link-email-addresses-to-15-million-accounts\u002F",[14,16,17],"https:\u002F\u002Ftrello.com\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.trello.com\u002Ffavicon.ico",15111945,"known",null,"unknown","Critical",[24,25,26],"Email addresses","Names","Usernames","\u003Cp>The January 2024 Trello incident is a verified record linking 15,111,945 unique email addresses to names and usernames.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Types of Exposed Data and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>The verified scope consists of 15,111,945 unique email addresses together with names and Trello usernames that could be associated with those addresses.\u003C\u002Fstrong> Passwords, telephone numbers, payment details, private messages, board content, cards and attachments are not verified fields in this record. The core risk is that profile details which may individually be public were linked in bulk to email addresses that were not intended to be public. This relationship can help an attacker confirm that an address has an account, create more convincing messages using a real name and username, and research the same identifier elsewhere. Because no password is present, the record is not a direct release of sign-in credentials. If a user reused a password exposed in another incident, however, a confirmed account association can make automated sign-in attempts more targeted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Breach Timeline and Technical Details\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The data was offered for sale around 16 January 2024 and was later added to a verified breach catalogue. Investigations indicated that the actor tested email addresses from earlier data collections against a publicly reachable Trello profile resource to identify valid accounts. The resource returned public fields such as a profile name and username for an email query, enabling bulk association between a private address and a public profile. The platform operator said it found no evidence of unauthorised access to Trello systems or user profiles, so the event should not be described as theft of an account database. After the misuse was identified, unauthenticated users and services were prevented from requesting another person's public information by email. The appropriate classification is account enumeration and scraping through an API, not a third-party supplier incident or password leak.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>People using a real name, workplace identity or easily recognised username may be more visible to targeted phishing. For corporate addresses, an attacker can combine the employer and Trello association to create a fake board invitation, task notice, team-membership request or password-reset message. Reusing the same username on social networks and developer platforms increases cross-profile correlation risk. A match does not prove that an account was taken over, a private board was read or a password was exposed. Risk should be assessed using the address's presence in other breaches, password-reuse history, public profile details and suspicious messages received. Unexpected board invitations, unknown workspace requests and unfamiliar sign-in alerts deserve particular scrutiny.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Immediate Steps to Take\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>First review the security settings, active sessions and multifactor-authentication status of your Trello and connected Atlassian account.\u003C\u002Fstrong> End sessions you do not recognise, confirm that recovery methods belong to you, and enable a passkey or phishing-resistant authentication where available. Although no password is verified here, replace reused passwords with a long, unique credential for every account. Rather than following a link in an emailed board invitation or security warning, open the service directly using its known address. Check the sender domain, invitation creator and whether the request fits your team's context. Reduce full names, biographies or links that do not need to remain public and leave unused workspaces. For a managed account, report suspicious invitations to the security team and never disclose a password or verification code in a message.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>A password manager that generates a separate credential for every service, together with passkeys where supported, prevents a password from another collection being tried successfully against Trello. Since the primary email account is a recovery hub, protect it with strong authentication, sign-in alerts and reviews of connected applications. Review profile visibility regularly and manage the link between work and personal identities when the same username appears across platforms. Organisations should not trust collaboration invitations solely because their wording looks familiar; processes should verify the sender and destination domain. Single sign-on, conditional access and central revocation of suspicious sessions reduce takeover risk. This event shows how querying a private identifier against public profile data can turn individually harmless fields into a bulk security concern.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Check Your Data\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Check your email address through the secure search field to learn whether it appears in the Trello collection and prioritise account-security steps if a match is returned.\u003C\u002Fstrong> A result does not mean your password was published, private boards were viewed or your account was taken over; it reports only that the address was linked to fields such as a name and username. Review profile visibility, active sessions, connected applications and recent security notices after a match. Verify unexpected invitations by opening the application directly. No result can guarantee that the address was absent from every other incident. Continued monitoring, unique passwords and strong authentication provide effective defence if this profile relationship is later used for social engineering or an account-takeover attempt.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Trello Data Breach (15.1 Million Reported Records)","Trello Data Breach. 15.1 Million reported records were reported. Reported data: Email addresses, Names, Usernames. Review the scope, risks, and protective…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Ftrello-official.webp",false,{"name":34,"sector":35,"country":36,"website":9,"websiteArchiveUrl":28,"websiteStatus":28,"websiteCheckedAt":20},"Trello (Atlassian)","Technology","United States"]