[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f30i67ynrpb8hn":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"publishedAt":13,"modifiedDate":14,"contentUpdatedAt":14,"source":15,"sourceUrl":16,"sourceUrls":17,"pwnCount":20,"affectedCount":20,"affectedCountStatus":21,"affectedCountLowerBound":13,"affectedCountUnit":22,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":23,"availableLocales":24,"translations":26,"severity":29,"dataClasses":30,"description":46,"seoTitle":47,"seoDescription":48,"logoUrl":49,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":50,"isMalware":50,"company":51},"6a452308a20f867c8ba8e778","University of Nottingham","University of Nottingham Data Breach","university-of-nottingham","nottingham.ac.uk","2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z","2026-06-10T22:13:31.000Z",null,"2026-07-27T16:11:14.802Z","Verified breach record","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com\u002Fnews\u002Fsecurity\u002Fnottingham-university-data-breach-affects-over-450-000-students\u002F",[16,18,19],"https:\u002F\u002Fthetab.com\u002F2026\u002F06\u002F12\u002Fcriminal-hacker-group-threatens-to-publish-nottingham-students-data-online-if-uni-doesnt-pay","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.itpro.com\u002Fsecurity\u002Fnottingham-university-cyber-attack-everything-we-know-so-far-as-shinyhunters-claims-responsibility",454635,"known","unknown","en",[23,25],"tr",{"en":27,"tr":28},{"slug":9},{"slug":9},"High",[31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45],"Academic records","Citizenship statuses","Dates of birth","Disabilities","Email addresses","Ethnicities","Genders","IP addresses","Names","Passport numbers","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Purchases","Salutations","Usernames","\u003Cp>The University of Nottingham data breach is a high-impact education sector incident that became visible on June 9, 2026, affecting accounts associated with the university. The record contains academic records, dates of birth, passport numbers, phone numbers, addresses, IP addresses, usernames, and demographic fields, along with approximately 454,635 unique email addresses. This data combination not only increases the risk of email-focused phishing but also the risk of long-term targeting of student, alumni, staff, and applicant profiles.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Leaked data types include academic records, citizenship statuses, birth dates, disability information, email addresses, ethnic background fields, gender information, IP addresses, full names, passport numbers, phone numbers, physical addresses, purchase data, salutation information, and usernames. These fields can be sensitive even on their own; when considered together, they create a detailed profile of a person's educational background, identity information, means of contact, and relationship with the campus. Passport numbers and birth dates can be misused in identity verification processes. Address, phone, and email fields support convincing fraud scenarios. Academic records and disability information have a high level of privacy, so the record should be classified as sensitive.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The verified scope includes approximately 454,635 affected accounts and the data categories listed above. The record is associated with the University of Nottingham domain, and the sector context is education. Within the scope, payment card numbers, bank accounts, passwords, private message content, or full document copies are not held as verified fields. Therefore, the risk assessment is limited to verified academic, identity, contact, and demographic fields. The breach date is in 2026; this breach record corresponds to the verified dataset from the 2026 period, not the 2025 ingest of an old incident. This distinction is important for correctly interpreting the incident timing on the account security screen.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Groups at risk may include students, graduates, academic staff, administrative staff, prospective students, and individuals with a history of transactions with university services. Phishing messages become more convincing for people with passport numbers, citizenship status, date of birth, and address information. Targeting based on educational background, scholarship or enrollment-themed fraud, and social engineering risks increase for individuals whose academic records are affected. Multi-channel contact may be attempted for accounts where phone numbers and email addresses are present together. Technical fields such as username and IP address also generate additional risk in account matching, location estimation, and session security examinations.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Affected users should use strong and unique passwords for their university account, personal email account, and other services linked with the same credentials. If multi-factor authentication is not enabled, it should be activated immediately. Unexpected messages themed around university, scholarship, registration, visa, passport, payment, or student services should be carefully examined. Personal information should not be shared in verification requests received by phone, and the transaction request should be additionally confirmed through official channels. Official account activity should be monitored against suspicious applications containing passport numbers or dates of birth. Users should check their email filters, session history, and recovery information for signs of unauthorized access.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>This incident demonstrates the risk of storing identity, academic records, and communication data together in educational institutions. On the institutional side, data retention periods should be shortened, access rights should be limited to the job role, and highly sensitive areas should be maintained with separate protection layers. Passport numbers, disability information, and demographic fields should be subject to regular access audits. On the user side, using a password manager, multi-factor authentication, and a separate email address strengthens long-term defense. After a similar incident, changing the password alone is not sufficient; phishing awareness, account recovery information, and official notification channels should also be regularly checked.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>If the address was used as a student, staff, alumni, or application account, the risk may be higher. Although the record does not confirm a password leak, it is considered sensitive due to the extensive identity and contact fields. Users should review the login history on critical accounts using the same email address, keep recovery email and phone information up to date, and verify suspicious messages through official channels without responding. Since fields such as passport, address, or date of birth cannot be changed, long-term phishing warnings should be kept active.\u003C\u002Fp>","University of Nottingham Data Breach (454.6 Thousand Reported Records)","University of Nottingham Data Breach. 454.6 Thousand reported records are reported. Reported data: Academic records, Citizenship statuses, Dates of birth…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fnottingham_ac_uk.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":52,"country":53,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":54,"websiteStatus":54,"websiteCheckedAt":13},"Education","United Kingdom",""]