[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f2qgfxx640hlp0":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"publishedAt":13,"modifiedDate":14,"contentUpdatedAt":15,"source":16,"sourceUrl":17,"sourceUrls":18,"pwnCount":20,"affectedCount":20,"affectedCountStatus":21,"affectedCountLowerBound":13,"affectedCountUnit":22,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":23,"availableLocales":24,"translations":26,"severity":29,"dataClasses":30,"description":39,"seoTitle":40,"seoDescription":41,"logoUrl":42,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":43,"isMalware":43,"company":44},"6a4cd777cc3beebea2ce5f48","Valley Family Health Care","Valley Family Health Care Data Breach","valley-family-health-care","vfhc.org","2026-03-07T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-07T10:39:51.605Z",null,"2026-09-17T16:22:24.919Z","2026-07-19T00:10:20.247Z","Manual reviewed breach record","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.vfhc.org\u002Fnotice-of-data-security-incident\u002F",[17,19],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hipaajournal.com\u002Fvalley-family-health-care-trizetto-breach\u002F",1891536,"known","unknown","en",[23,25],"tr",{"en":27,"tr":28},{"slug":9},{"slug":9},"Critical",[31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"Names","Dates of birth","Email addresses","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Social security numbers","Health insurance information","Personal health data","\u003Cp>The Valley Family Health Care data breach is related to two separate risk incidents in 2026 affecting the healthcare organization providing medical, dental, women's health, and behavioral health services in Idaho and Oregon. In January 2026, it was officially announced that patient data may have been affected through a third-party insurance eligibility verification process. In March 2026, a larger set of records associated with the organization’s name was alleged to have been released. This LeakData record has been prepared to clearly explain to the user the large dataset from March 7, 2026, and the identity, contact, and health-related risks observed in this incident.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Leaked Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The data fields seen in this record are name, date of birth, email address, phone number, physical address, and Social Security number. On the health reporting side, there is also mention of health insurance member number, Medicare-like identifiers, insurer name, service provider name, primary insured or dependent information, demographic fields, and other information related to health insurance. In the claim of a larger record set, it is stated that patient records, insurance information, and protected health information are included. When these fields are evaluated together, the incident carries critical sensitivity.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Fields such as name, date of birth, address, and phone number can provide sufficient grounds for personal fraud. When this is combined with the context of a Social Security number, health insurance, or medical file, the risk is not limited to just fake emails; more serious consequences can arise, such as medical identity theft, fraudulent insurance claims, credit applications, and impersonation of care services. It should not be assumed that every individual has all of these fields, but the listed types of data are high risk both individually and collectively.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The official patient notification indicates that some records may have been exposed to unauthorized access starting from November 2024 during the third-party insurance eligibility process and that this situation was reported to the organization in December 2025. A separate claim of a large record set emerged on March 7, 2026, and it was stated that it contained more than one million records. The open record set shows 1,891,536 rows. This number may not correspond exactly to the number of individuals; there may be multiple rows or files for a single person.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For this reason, the record has not been marked as fully verified. While the organization's official statement supports the health and insurance fields, it is based on external leak investigations for the large row count in March 2026 and some details. This record does not merge two events and present them as a single definitive institutional statement; it assesses the official third-party event, the claim of a larger record set, and the verifiable risk areas from a user perspective separately. Since payment card and bank account information are not included in the official statement, they have not been added to the data classes.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Individuals at risk are patients and patient guarantors who have received medical services, dental services, women's health services, behavioral health services, or insurance eligibility processing from Valley Family Health Care. Family members, children, dependents, individuals listed as dependents on the insurance policy, and those who make payments or appointment arrangements on behalf of the patient may also be affected. Since health centers retain a large number of demographic and insurance fields, former patients should not be considered out of risk either.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The context of a patient file or insurance information makes attackers' messages more convincing. Users may be targeted under the pretext of fake appointment confirmation, invoice updates, insurance verification, identity verification, or credit monitoring record. Individuals with a Social Security number face higher risks of credit and official transactions. In affected individuals, areas such as health insurance numbers or Medicare-like fields should also be monitored for the risk of medical identity theft and fraudulent service claims.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Users who notice a match should first secure their email accounts and check for any unusual login, forwarding rule, or password reset attempts. If the same email is used for health portals, insurance, banking, or public services, a unique password should be set for each account, and multi-factor authentication should be enabled. If the phone or address field is affected, caution should be taken against fake appointment, payment, insurance update, and delivery messages.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Individuals whose social security number, insurance ID, or health information may have been affected should review their credit reports and, if deemed necessary, consider credit freezes or fraud alert options. Health insurance explanation documents, patient portal notifications, and prescription and service history should be regularly checked. If an unknown service, claim, or payment is observed, it should be discussed with the relevant healthcare provider or insurance company through known official communication channels.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Since health and identity data remain unchanged for a long time, this incident cannot be resolved with a one-time password reset. Users should continue steps such as credit monitoring, checking health insurance claim history, regularly reviewing patient portal notifications, and verifying fake service invoices for an extended period. Individuals acting on behalf of family members, especially children and the elderly, should not respond to calls or emails without verification.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The most important point in corporate and individual security is to verify seemingly legitimate requests through a second channel. Links received on behalf of a health center, insurance company, or identity protection service should not be used directly; the organization's known web address or phone number should be preferred. Users should make account recovery questions difficult to guess, avoid reusing old passwords, and keep notifications enabled on critical accounts. This way, resistance to targeted attempts that may come months after the event increases.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If a match is seen on LeakData with the Valley Family Health Care record, the user should first understand the type of matching data. Email and phone matches carry phishing risks, address matches pose targeted physical and social engineering risks, and Social Security number or health insurance fields create credit and medical identity risks. Not all matches carry the same weight; the correct action should be chosen according to the sensitivity of the matching field.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This record has been prepared by considering the official health notification, the claim of a large data set, and the types of data seen in the health sector together. The number of rows indicates the risk scale and should not be interpreted as the exact number of unique individuals. Users should reset their passwords if matched, enable multi-factor authentication, monitor credit and health insurance records, and verify any unfamiliar appointment, invoice, or insurance request through a separate channel.\u003C\u002Fp>","Valley Family Health Care Data Breach (1.9 Million Reported Records)","Valley Family Health Care Data Breach. 1.9 Million reported records are reported. Reported data: Names, Dates of birth, Email addresses. Review the scope…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fvalley-family-health-care.png",false,{"name":7,"sector":45,"country":46,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":47,"websiteStatus":47,"websiteCheckedAt":13},"Healthcare","United States",""]