[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f2s871rh7j909x":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":11,"modifiedDate":11,"contentUpdatedAt":12,"source":13,"sourceUrl":14,"sourceUrls":15,"pwnCount":20,"affectedCount":20,"affectedCountStatus":21,"affectedCountLowerBound":22,"affectedCountUnit":23,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"severity":24,"dataClasses":25,"description":37,"seoTitle":38,"seoTitleEn":39,"seoDescription":38,"seoDescriptionEn":40,"logoUrl":41,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":4,"isSpamList":42,"isMalware":42,"company":43},"68e3266eda11adda488253fd","Vodafone","Vodafone Iceland Data Breach","vodafone","vodafone.is","2013-11-30T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-19T00:00:46.553Z","Verified breach record","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.twingate.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftips\u002Fvodafone-data-breach",[14,16,17,18,19],"https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2013\u002F11\u002Fvodafone-iceland-hacked-and-exposed.html","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.theregister.com\u002Fsecurity\u002F2013\u002F12\u002F02\u002Fvodafone-iceland-bjoerked-after-turkish-hacker-pinches-passwords\u002F591017","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.icelandreview.com\u002Fnews\u002Fthousands-passwords-and-messages-online-after-hacking\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fvodafone.is\u002F",56021,"known",null,"unknown","Medium",[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36],"Credit cards","Email addresses","Government issued IDs","IP addresses","Names","Passwords","Phone numbers","Physical addresses","Purchases","SMS messages","Usernames","\u003Cp>The Vodafone data breach is a confirmed security incident that affected the Icelandic telecom operation associated with the domain vodafone.is and became public on November 30, 2013. The incident involves approximately 56,021 accounts and very large personal data fields collected from various internal systems. The leaked information includes credit card data, email addresses, national identification numbers, IP addresses, names, passwords, phone numbers, addresses, purchase records, SMS messages, and usernames. The scope being related to the telecom service, combined with financial and communication data being visible at the same time, has led the records to be marked as sensitive.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Leaking Data Types and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The data classes affected in this incident are not limited to ordinary account information. While email addresses and passwords pose a direct risk for account takeover attempts, phone numbers, addresses, IP addresses, and usernames make it easier to match a person's identity across different services. Credit card information and purchase records can be used for financial fraud, fake payment alerts, and targeted phishing. Government-issued identifiers such as national ID numbers are highly sensitive information that can be misused in authentication processes.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The inclusion of SMS messages in a leak exacerbates the situation. The message content can provide clues about personal relationships, work correspondence, verification codes, subscription details, or private communication patterns. A data set from a telecom provider gives an attacker not only account information but also a broad context about a person's digital and physical environment. Therefore, the risk does not end with merely changing passwords; financial accounts, authentication habits, phone line security, and social engineering defenses must be addressed together.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Verified Scope and Boundaries\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The main scope was kept as 56,021 affected accounts. Publicly available reliable records confirm that the incident occurred in the period of November 2013, was indexed on November 30, 2013, and is associated with Vodafone's operation in Iceland. Some reports mention higher raw account numbers or older database dumps; this difference may relate to raw file rows, duplicates, different internal sources, and the parsing of records representing accounts. The main number shown to the user has therefore been kept consistent with the account-based verified scope.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The registration is considered verified in terms of the company brand and domain name. In contrast, only supported data fields are included in public disclosure; unverified bank account details or broader claims are not added to the data class. The current domain directs from vodafone.is to another Icelandic telecom page; this does not undermine the accuracy of the past event but shows that the company's active brand and domain name usage has changed over time. Therefore, the registration was not marked as retired, but the company's industry was updated to telecom instead of social media.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The highest risk is for Vodafone Iceland customers who reuse the same password for email, social media, banking, cloud services, work accounts, or other telecom transactions. People whose credit card and purchase records are visible should be more cautious about financial fraud messages. Users with a phone number and SMS messages can be targeted through fake operator calls, SIM change requests, subscription renewal alerts, and messages requesting verification codes. For individuals with a national ID number, identity verification fraud and account opening attempts are also of particular concern.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The risk can extend beyond an individual account for people using a work phone or corporate subscription. If the same phone number is linked to work email, corporate applications, or administrator accounts, an attacker can create more convincing social engineering scenarios. The content of SMS messages can provide context about personal relationships or internal communication within the organization. Therefore, affected users should review not only their old Vodafone password but also all critical accounts connected to their phone number and email address.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Urgent Measures to Be Taken\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>The first step is to change the password on all services that use the same or similar password as your Vodafone account. Priority should be given to email accounts, banking and payment services, social media, cloud storage, and work accounts. A unique, long, and random password should be chosen for each service; repeated old passwords should be identified using a password manager. Multi-factor authentication should be enabled on email and financial accounts, and if possible, app-based codes, hardware keys, or passkeys should be used.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Credit card transactions and bank accounts should be monitored for unusual activity. Caution should be exercised against suspicious subscription, refund, payment verification, or operator update messages. If SIM swap protection, a customer service password, or additional authentication options are available for the phone line, they should be enabled. Verification codes received via SMS should not be shared with anyone; instead of links claimed to be from the operator, it is preferable to manually enter the service provider's official address to check.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Violations originating from telecommunications have long-term effects because phone numbers, email addresses, and identity information can remain the same for years. For permanent protection, reliance on SMS verification for critical accounts should be reduced, and stronger multi-factor options should be adopted. Password managers should be used regularly, and the same password should not be allowed to remain on different accounts. In incidents involving credit card and identity information, simply changing the password should not be considered sufficient; financial monitoring, credit card renewal, and identity verification alerts should also be considered.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>For corporate users, the links between phone numbers, email, and work systems should be regularly audited. Old telecom accounts, billing portals, and customer service logins should be protected with strong passwords. Employees should be trained on operator impersonation, SIM swap fraud, and phishing via SMS. If the phone number is used as a recovery method for high-value accounts, additional security layers should be added. This incident shows that telecom data can simultaneously trigger financial, identity, and communication risks.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Ch2>Record Control and User Action\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Users who see the Vodafone result on LeakData should consider it as a verified telecom breach associated with Vodafone service in Iceland. The main scope shown is 56,021 accounts; supported data fields include credit card information, email addresses, government ID, IP addresses, names, passwords, phone numbers, addresses, purchase records, SMS messages, and usernames. The incident date and the added date are kept as November 30, 2013; the year 2025 is not the main date to be shown to the user for this result.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The matched user should first update the accounts that use the same password, and then check the security of their phone line and financial accounts. Credit card transactions should be monitored, and if necessary, the card should be renewed or additional verification should be requested. Unexpected verification, debt, refund, or subscription messages received via phone number should not be trusted. Due to highly sensitive areas such as national ID number and SMS content, the user should take a holistic approach to not only a single account password but also the security of their identity and phone line.\u003C\u002Fp>","","Vodafone Iceland Data Breach (56 Thousand Reported Records)","Vodafone Iceland Data Breach. 56 Thousand reported records were reported. Reported data: Credit cards, Email addresses, Government issued IDs. Review the…","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fvodafone_is.webp",false,{"name":44,"sector":45,"country":46,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":38,"websiteStatus":38,"websiteCheckedAt":22},"Vodafone Iceland","Telecommunications","Iceland"]