[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$f3fzypcsm2qqlf":3},{"success":4,"breach":5},true,{"_id":6,"name":7,"title":8,"slug":9,"domain":10,"breachDate":11,"addedDate":12,"publishedAt":13,"modifiedDate":14,"contentUpdatedAt":15,"source":16,"sourceUrl":17,"sourceUrls":18,"pwnCount":24,"affectedCount":24,"affectedCountStatus":25,"affectedCountLowerBound":13,"affectedCountUnit":26,"hasEnglishDescription":4,"contentLocale":27,"availableLocales":28,"translations":30,"severity":33,"dataClasses":34,"description":37,"seoTitle":38,"seoDescription":39,"logoUrl":40,"isVerified":4,"isSensitive":41,"isSpamList":41,"isMalware":41,"company":42},"6a4548352df59bd981ce5f47","Webkinz","Webkinz Data Breach","webkinz","webkinz.com","2020-04-01T00:00:00.000Z","2026-07-01T17:02:43.938Z",null,"2026-07-02T11:45:44.289Z","2026-07-19T16:39:58.308Z","Verified children's online gaming credential breach","https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002F20200419075557id_\u002Fhttps:\u002F\u002Fwww.zdnet.com\u002Farticle\u002Fhacker-leaks-23-million-usernames-and-passwords-from-webkinz-childrens-game\u002F",[17,19,20,21,22,23],"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.zdnet.com\u002Farticle\u002Fhacker-leaks-23-million-usernames-and-passwords-from-webkinz-childrens-game\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bitdefender.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fblog\u002Fhotforsecurity\u002Fdata-breach-bad-actor-leaks-23-million-account-credentials-from-webkinz-childrens-platform","https:\u002F\u002Fwebkinznewz.ganzworld.com\u002Fannouncements\u002Fsecurity-update-password-update-required-for-all-accounts\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Ftwitter.com\u002Fwebkinz\u002Fstatus\u002F1251956371488157700","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.webkinz.com\u002F",22982319,"known","unknown","en",[27,29],"tr",{"en":31,"tr":32},{"slug":9},{"slug":9},"Critical",[35,36],"Passwords","Usernames","\u003Cp>The Webkinz data breach exposed 22,982,319 usernames and MD5-Crypt password hashes in April 2020. A 1 GB file associated with the online game for children and families was published on a hacking forum. The verified fields in the inspected file were limited to usernames and password hashes. Accordingly, \u003Cstrong>22,982,319 username-and-password pairs\u003C\u002Fstrong> describe the released record scope; email addresses, phone numbers, physical addresses, and payment data must not be included in that count.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Types of Exposed Data and Risks\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The released file contained Webkinz usernames and \u003Cstrong>MD5-Crypt password hashes\u003C\u002Fstrong>. MD5-Crypt is not plaintext and is not identical to raw MD5, but it is obsolete by modern password-storage standards and offers inadequate resistance to offline guessing. If a short, common, or predictable password is recovered, every other account using the same password may also be at risk. Reporting stated that hashed values of parent email addresses were obtained separately but were not present in the publicly released file. Email addresses should therefore not be added as a verified data class. At the time, the company said Webkinz accounts had never requested addresses, phone numbers, or last names and were not connected to eStore account data. There is no verified basis for claiming that payment details or real-world identity records appeared in the released file.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Breach Timeline and Technical Details\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Reporting places the intrusion in early April 2020; because an exact day was not disclosed, 1 April is used as a month-level reference date. An investigation published on 18 April said researchers had helped obtain and verify a copy of the file, which contained 22,982,319 username-and-password pairs. Sources cited in that report said the attacker used an SQL injection flaw in a website form and that Webkinz staff detected and patched the point of entry. On 19 April, the company said it was aware of an alleged breach story, was investigating, and advised concerned users to change their passwords. An official security update then required every player to update the account password once before signing in. Although the initial-access claim is supported by credible reporting, no detailed forensic report or final public incident report from the company was located.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>User Groups at Risk\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>The most directly affected group is current and former players who had a Webkinz account before April 2020. Anyone who reused the same username and password on another game, social platform, or email account may face credential-stuffing attempts. Because the player base includes children, password changes and account recovery should be handled with a parent or guardian. A username is not necessarily a real name, so the records should not automatically be linked to a specific child's identity. Even so, a username can support in-game impersonation, fake support messages, or account-takeover attempts. \u003Cstrong>Email addresses are not a verified field in the released file\u003C\u002Fstrong>, so this incident alone should not be represented as a confirmed email leak or mailing list for phishing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Immediate Steps to Take\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>If you have a Webkinz account and did not update its password after 2020, choose a new, unique password through the official sign-in screen. Replace the same or similar password anywhere else it was used, prioritizing the associated email account, game stores, and parent accounts. For a child's account, create the new password together with a parent or guardian, explain that it must not be shared, and discuss fake support requests. If access has been lost, use only official support channels; never post a password, pet name, or recovery detail in a forum or message. Review active sessions, the attached email address, and unexpected account changes. Treat the eStore account separately: the company said it was not connected to Webkinz account data, so eStore payment information should not be presumed to be in this file.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Long-Term Security Strategies\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>A different password for every service prevents a recovered game password from spreading to other accounts. Families can keep separate password-manager entries for children's accounts and periodically verify the recovery email address. Even if Webkinz does not offer multi-factor authentication, enable it on important connected services such as email and game-store accounts. Do not forget old accounts; ask official support to close or delete accounts that are no longer needed. Children should learn not to give passwords to people promising in-game gifts or free memberships and to show suspicious messages to an adult. For service operators, parameterized queries, modern password hashing, regular penetration testing, data minimization, and clear incident communication provide lasting safeguards.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Ch2>Check Your Data\u003C\u002Fh2>\u003Cp>Because this Webkinz record has no verified email addresses, an email-only LeakData search may not display a Webkinz match. An empty result does not prove that an account used before 2020 was absent from the username-and-password file. The safest check is to determine whether you had an account at the time and whether its old password remains active on any other service. Never enter the password itself into search forms, forums, or third-party sites. If you have a Webkinz account, use the official password-reset and support paths, then protect every other account that reused the old password with a separate, unique credential.\u003C\u002Fp>","Webkinz Data Breach (23 Million Reported Records)","Webkinz Data Breach. 23 Million reported records are reported. Reported data: Passwords, Usernames. Review the scope, risks, and protective steps.","\u002Fuploads\u002Flogo\u002Fwebkinz_com.webp",false,{"name":7,"sector":43,"country":44,"website":10,"websiteArchiveUrl":45,"websiteStatus":45,"websiteCheckedAt":13},"Children's online gaming and toys","Canada",""]